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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
The growth in the national debt has been a major concern of public
policy in recent years reflecting the increasing cost of servicing this
debt. Consiclerable attention has been given both to the need to bring
the deht under control and to the cost to the nation from the outflow
of interest on foreign debt. However, rather less attention has been
given to the way in which the high level of public sector borrowing
has been financed and to the impact on the economy of the method
of financing actually adopted. The purpose of Otis paper is: firstly, to
examine the likely trend in tfic national debt and the cost of servicing
it in the period 1986-1990; secondly, to examine the implications for
the growth of output and the balance of payments of the manner of
financing the increased debt; and thirdly to consider how the rcsuhs
of tfiese exercises should modify our view of the medium-term prospects
tbr the Irish economy and of the appropriate stance of economic policy.
It considers these issues in a medium term context and, as a result,
is not concerned with immediate developments in the area of exchange
rates and interest rates.
Ideally a full model of the financial sector of the Irish economy
should be used to examine the effects of different strategies on financing
tfic national debt. However, no such model exists and the empirical
research necessary to construct such a model has yet to be undertaken.
Tire research based on data from before Ireland’s entry into the EMS
is not very relevant to the current situation. As a result a less formal
approach is adopted in this paper. Bascd on the limited range of
evidence currently available, Chapter 2 gives a brief discussion of how
the monetary sector of the Irish economy works and how it was
changed by entry into the EMS. It considers the extent to which
interest rates are influenced by domestic policies and the factors
affecting the demand for different types of financial assets, in particular
for government debt. While this discussion cannot be used to derive
quantified results, it does allow some conclusions to be reached in the
rest of the paper on the way the monetary sector is likely to react to
future circumstances and on the desirability of different policies on
tile financing of the debt.
To examine the effects of different borrowing and interest rate
assumptions on the national debt and national debt interest, a simple
model of the debt was developed. It makes possible projections of
interest payments and deht repayments consistent with the structure
of the debt of a given hase period and with a given set of assumptions
concerning borrowing, interest rates and exchange rates. This model,
together with the assumptions which underlie it, is described in detail
in Appendix 1. It is used in Chapter 3 to examine the growth of the
debt and debt interest over the first half of the decade. In particular
the effects of different methods of financing the debt, on interest and
debt outstanding at the end of 1985, are examined. The demand for
government securities and its interaction with the supply of securities
is considered using the flow of funds data for the years 1960-85
presented in O’Connell (1986). Some conclusions are drawn
conccrnlng policy on the financing of the borrowing requirement.
"l’hc future course of interest payments and the level of the national
debt over the years 1986-1990 are examined in Chapter 4. To provide
a basis for this exercise a henchmark or baseline projection for the
real economy over the relevant period is presented in that chapter.
In addition a range of ahernative assumptions concerning interest
rates and government borrowing are also examined. The benchmark
projection is a modified version of the Medium Term Outlook: 1986-1990
(P. Bacon, 1986). The debt simulation model is used to derive
consistent forecasts of thc national debt, national debt interest and the
composition of government borrowing based on the different sets of
assumptions concerning the future. The likely demand for government
securities is considered on thc basis of the benchmark projections for
savings and investment. Finally, the implications for interest rates, the
exchange rate and the real economy of the interaction of the demand
and supply of government securities are considered in a qualitative
rather than a quantitative framework.
The conclusion, Chapter 5 sets out the implications of the analysis
carried out in this paper for economic policy in the medium term.
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Chapter 2
THE EMS AND THE MONETARY SECTOR OF THE IRISH
ECONOMY
In the 1970s it was generally accepted that the monetary sector of
tile h’ish econonay closely approximated tile textbook examples of small
open economics operating under fixed excbange rates. Prior to joining
tile EMS tbere was no expectation of a change ill the fixed exchange
rate between tbe h’ish pound and Sterling and the exchange rate was
not a source of uncertainty concerning the future value of financial
assets within tbe sterling area. In addition tbere was free movement
of capital into and out of tile Irish economy. As a result, Sterling and
h-ish pound financial assets and liabilities were treated as virtually
intcrcbangeable by both Irish and UK lenders and borrowers. Tile
interest rates payable on similar assets denominated in Irish pounds
and Sterling were closely related (see Browne and O’Connell, 1978).
Even in tile mid 1970’s, when the exchequer borrowing requirement
and the balance of payments deficit rose rapidly, there was a close
relationship between tile Irish and UK exchequer bill rates. Because
of tile small size of the h’ish economy vis-a-vis tbat of the UK, the
volume of government paper offered for sale generally did not affcct
tile interest rate payable on that debt. That interest rate was
determined by conditions in tile UK market. Tile foreign sector, in
this case the UK, was effectively tile residual market which either
bought or sold securities to ensure that the market cleared at tile going
interest rate. However, Honohan, (1982), has cautioned that this
picture should not be over-interpreted as it relied on tile maintenance
ofordcrly financial markets and otber structural objectives of monetary
policy.
A corollary of this free movement of capital between Ireland and
the UK was that the Irish government could not control tile level of
domestic interest rates due to its inability to control the domestic supply
of money. Attempts to tighten tile domestic money supply by open
market operations would only attract funds from the UK. This inflow
from the UK would not significantly alter UK interest rates but would
push Irish rates back into line with UK rates.
In the case of the Irish private sector, its demand for Irish
government debt was a function of the wealth that was available for
investment and the expected rates of return on government securities
and other alternative assets such as residential and commercial
property and machinery and equipment. Over the 1960s and 1970s
the proportion of private sector funds going on Irish government
securities changed markedly from year to year depending on changes
in expectations concerning future relative rates of return. While the
rate of return on government securities, exchequer bills and certain
other financial assets was primarily determined on the UK market,
this was not the case for many real {immoveable) assets such as
buildings or industrial plant. As indicated above, changes in the
expected rates of return on these assets altered the domestic demand
for government debt from year to year. However, because of the free
flow of capital between Ireland and the UK these changed domestic
demand conditions for Irish government debt did not alter the rate
of return on that debt but rather resulted in a Ilow of funds between
the UK and Ireland sutllcient to bring total demand tbr such debt
into line with total supply.
However, from the time that Ireland decided to join the EMS at
the end of 1978 there was a major change in the conditions under
which the Irish monetary sector operated. Prior to joining the EMS
there was no uncertainty concerning the exchange rate between the
Irish pound and Sterling so that Irish debt and UK government debt
were treated by the private sector as very similar assets which were
close substitutes for one another. After joining the EMS this was no
longer the case. The future course of exchange rates could significantly
alter the expected rate of return on these two assets making one or
the other potentially more profitable. At the time of joining the EMS
some people felt that the decision merely involved a shift from a
partnership with the UK to one with a monetary group dominated
by West Germany (McCarthy, 1979). Instead of the pre-EMS
situation, where Irish interest rates were determined by UK interest
rates, they would now be determined by German rates. However, the
certainty which had persisted for over 150 years concerning the
relationship between the Irish pound and Sterling was not replaced
by a similar certainty concerning the exchange rate between the DM
and the Irish pound. It was this introduction of exchange rate
uncertainty which completely altered the situation: Irish government
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securities were not seen as perfect substitutes for DM securities in the
way they had been for Sterling paper.
The significance of the change to a regime of exchange rate
uncertainty was probably not fully reafised at the time. Entry into
tile EMS was felt by tile govcrment to represent a commitment to
something akin to a fixed exchange rate regime and it was not
envisaged that tbe Irish pound or other currencies would alter their
central positions within tile EMS other than in exceptional
circumstances. However, to those agents in the private sector with
funds to invest, tile EMS was not seen as such a permanent fixture.
To German investors with previous experience of the "snake" there
was no certainty that the Irish pound/DM exchange rate would remain
fixed for tile foreseable future. As a result, Irish interest rates did not
converge to tile level of German interest rates. However, this does not
mean that Irish interest rates were determined independently of
interest rates in the United Kingdom or Germany. While the
introduction of exchange controls in the Republic simultaneously with
entry into tile EMS somewhat restricted the scope of tile irish private
sector to invest abroad, this did not prevent capital inflows or outflows
through a wide variety of channels. It certainly did not prevent
investment or disinyestnaent in Ireland by foreigners. However, for the
Irish private sector, the decision to invest abroad now involved the
possibility of a capital loss or capital gain due to exchange rate changes.
A similar situation applied to foreigners investing in Ireland. For any
given expected change in fizture exchange rates there was an interest
differential between Ireland and Germany (or tile UK) which would
make it appear profitahie to invest abroad or for foreigners to invest
in Ireland. Thus, a crucial new dimension to the decision to invest
was the expectation concerning the exchange rate.
Under these circumstances, if private agents were not risk averse
given their expectations concerning future interest rates and future
exchange rates, they would move funds into or out of h’isb financial
assets depending on whether Irish or foreign assets appeared the nlore
profitable. This would ensure that the expected rate of return on Irish
lending equalled that expected on foreign lending (taking account of
expected exchange rate changes). In principle this situation would be
similar to that prevailing before entry into tile EMS in that, ignoring
tile mechanism whereby the private sector forms its expectations
concerning exchange rates, tile domestic money supply and domestic
interest rates would not be under domestic control.
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However, tile combination of risk aversion on the part of investors
with uncertainty concerning tile future movement of exchange rates
alters this situation. In a situation of uncertainty concerning the future,
the "expectation" concerning tile movement of exchange rates is only
the mid point of a range of possible outcomes. The greater tile
uncertainty tile wider this range and tile greater tile possibility of large
losses (as well as large gains) due to a wrong forecast. For risk averse
investors in Ireland or elsewherc this means that even ira foreign asset
is expected to yield a higher return than a comparable domestic asset,
investors may not be prepared to back their "hunch" and invest abroad
due to the possibility of heavy losses if their forecasts prove wrong.
Ahernatively, they may be only prepared to invest a limited part of
their portfolio in tile foreign asset to minimisc risk. As a result, the
uncertainty concerning [’uture exchange rate movements means that
foreign and domestic bonds are no longer perfect substitutes. Witbin
a rangc of interest differentials around the expected change in the
exchange rate, invcstors will be unwilling to invest in foreign assets.
However, as the interest difrercntial increases, the size of tile expected
profit abroad will tend to overcome the fears of future exchange rate
loss. The presence of risk and the risk aversion of investors means that
there will exist a band of interest rates around the mid point,
determined by foreign interest rates and the expected change in tile
cxcbange rate, within which domestic interest rates will be internally
determined by domestic supply and demand for funcls. This band
allows lirnitcd scope for domcstic policy action to influence interest
rates. However, tile size of the band within which this scope exists
may be relatively small and its mid point will be detcrmlned by market
forces and expectations concerning tile exchange rate.
The extent to which exchange rate uncertainty has made possible
an independent domestic monetary policy and independent
determination of domestic interest rates is not, as yet, cleat’. Writing
in 1982, O’Connell commenting on tile post EMS experience said that:
Short-term interest rates are now much more responsive to
domestic influences. At the same time, tile broad trend in longer-
term rates . . . is still strongly influenced by external developments.
However, he noted that there were exceptions to this such as the latter
part of 1980 and also following the February 1982 EMS rcafignment.
In a moclel of the Irish money market Browne (1986) concluded that
"ahhough the exchange rate absorbs some domestic monetary
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disequilibrium created by policy and other exogenous factors, it does
not provide any long-term autonomy for monetary policy". However,
this study did not consider the formation ofexchange rate expectations
and the related determination of the interest differential between
Ireland and other countries. This was due to the precise nature of the
model specification. As a result, it does not provide firm evidence on
the independence or otherwise of domestic interest rates.
The experience of the last five years suggests that domestic factors
have continued to exert a limited influence on domestic rates including
interest rates on government bonds. The rise in interest rates in late
1984 can be traced ultimately to the government’s policy of
maintaining a ceiling on direct foreign borrowing. It was not caused
by a change in foreign interest rates or exchange rate expectations.
However, because of uncertainty concerning the future movement of
exchange rates, rather than a change in their expected future levels,
there was at first no flow of funds into Ireland to off’set the rise in
interest rates. It was not until the first fialfof 1985 that an inflow of
foreign capital hcll)cd push down the interest differential between Irish
and toreign interest rates into line with expectations concerning future
movement in exchange rates. This experience shows the scope, albeit
limited, which now exists for domestic monetary policy (including
policy on debt management) to influence domestic interest rates.
The rise in interest rates at the end of 1985 and again inJuly 1986
was substantially driven by changes in exchange rate expectations
rather than a direct resuh of domestic policy changes. This experience
highlights the importance of this factor in determining the level of
domestic interest rates. However, in spite of its importance, the way
exchange rate expectations are formed in Ireland has not I)een
subjected to extensive empirical examination. Expectations themselves
arc a function of a range of variables and are significantly affected
by domestic policies. Trends in the balance of payments, the exchequer
borrowing requirement and the ovcrall competitiveness of the h’ish
economy compared to its trading partners, all have an influence. In
the first half of the 1980s expectations concerning the DM[I risfi pound
exchange rate, reflected in interest difl’erentials, generally over-
estimated the actual depreciation of the h’ish pound. For the future
it is iml)ortant to consider I)oth how domestic policy will influence
expectations and how it will affect the actual exchange rate.
Chapter 3
NATIONAL DEBT AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1980-85
3. I Introduction
As a rcsuh of large and continuing current budget deficits since
1973 and a large public capital programme, Ireland entered the 1980s
with a heavy burden of debt. From a position where public debt
represented just under 55 per cent of GNP in 1973, the debt GNP
ratio had risen to ahnost 80 per cent of GNP by the end of 1979 (see
Table 3.1, Figure 3.1). The acceleration of these trends ill the first
half of the 1980s needs little elaboration. As can be seen from Table
3. I, the national debt, expressed as a percentage of GNP, rose rapidly
over the period 1980-85 to over 120 per cent. National debt interest,
having been smaller in magnitude than tile current budget deficit in
1979, has substantially exceeded it in all years since 1982 (Table 3.2).
As a result, the management of the debt has had a major impact on
the budgetary situation through the size of the interest bill as well as
having important implications for the working of the economy through
its impact on the domestic financial system.
The model of the deht described in Appendix I is used in section
3.2 to examine the effects of the rise in foreign real interest rates on
"Fable 3. I : Ratio of National Debt to GNP
End Year Percentage End ~’ear Percentage
1960 64.2 1973 54.4
1961 64.3 1974 61.4
1962 64.9 1975 67.6
1963 65.6 1976 73.6
19~4 62.8 1977 72.2
1965 65.6 1978 72.5
1966 66.3 1979 76.7
1967 65.8 1980 79.8
1968 64.7 1981 86.2
1969 63.2 1982 95.6
1970 61.9 1983 109.3
1971 62,5 1984 119.5
1972 58.5 1985 123.6
Source: 1960-1978 I)epartment of Finance Databank: 1979-1985 Finance Accounts
The Definitions used for 1960-1979 are sfghdy diflizren from Ihose for 1979-85. The lalter arc
described in Appendix I.
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national debt intcrcst paid abroad. The/ml)lications ofthe composition
o£ borrowing For tile size or the interest bill arc considered in section
3.3. Thc efl’ects of changcs in tile currency composition o£ Foreign
borrowing, and of/he use ordifferent financial instruments for domestic
"Fable 3.2: .National Debt Interest and C.rrent Budget Deficit as a Percentage of GNP
End fear National Debt Interest* Current Budget Deficit**
£ million % £ million %
1979 478 6.3 522 6.8
1980 603 6.7 547 6.1
1981 827 7.6 820 7.6
1982 1,184 9.5 988 8.1
1983 1,348 I 0.1 1,085 8. I
1984 1,523 10.5 1,939 7.2
1985 1,845 12. I 1,284 8.4
*NatlonM Accoums definition, ilatert~t paid by Cenlra] GovernmcnL
**Front 1984 onwards the Post O01ce is excluded.
Fig, 3. I. Ratio of National Debt to GJVP (Per Cent)
1960 1963 1966 1969     1972 1975
SYMBOL VARIABLE
-- I)EBT/GNP RA’rlo
1978 1981     1984    1987
borrmving arc all considcred. Section 3.4 looks at Ihe demand tbr thc
dcbt by the clomcstic private sector. In section 3.5, the implications
ofdecislons on the composition ofdonaestic borrowing [br interest rates
arc examined and the appropriateness of tile policies actually followed
over tile period is considered in the final section.
In carrying out the dift’crent simulations described in this chapter,
the model of the debt described in Appendix 1 has bccn calibrated
so thai its rcsuhs match the actual OUlturn for the historical period,
1980-85.
3.2 Effects of High Real Interest Rates
The real interest rates experienced in the first half of the 1980s have
gcncrally been cxu-cmely high by historical standards (see Table 3.3).
They clmtrasl with the exceptionally low real interest rates of the mid-
1970s. The shili li’om very low to very high real interest rates in the
lnst ten years has been an important contributory factor to Ireland’s
growing debt problem. In an attempt Io identify the effects of this
rise in real interest rates on h’ish [brcign debt interest payments, tile
debt model was used to examine what would have been the el:li:cts of
a constant foreign rcM interest rate~ of 2 per cent over the period
1980-1985, substantially below tbc rates actually experienced. The
simulation was carried out using historical exchange rates for the six-
year period and the saving in national del~t interest was assumed to
have been used to reduce the level of foreign borrowing. No account
was taken of the eft’eels of such a dilli:rent interest rate regime on the
world economy or, more especially, on the domestic economy. In
particular, the effects of" such a change in foreign interest rates on
domestic interest rates was not examined because ofthe lack of evidence
on how such an ahernative external environmnlent would have
affectcd the h’ish financial sector. The failure to take account of these
additional elmnnels whereby world interest rates affect the Irish
economy means that the resuhing estimates of the effects of the high
interest rates on tile public sector debt over tile period will be very
much a lower I)otlnd.
I. "l’ills ir, volvcd ~ldju~ting ihl: ino(ll:l slmulalilln results b)’ ii¢lding ihe dillhrcnces Ileiwl~cn the
ill:ltlli[ ilill;r¢$1 paid iH c;ich vl~lr illld Ihl: inc,:tel’s e$1illlilll: ilrintereSl paid (sho’¢¢11 in t{lll:etnl.lix
Tables I and 2) to till2 medici’s silntilalilm restilil for Ihe different y, cenarios exanlinl2¢l.
7. l)cfincd as the l~rccnt:lgc change in Ihe C¢lllStllnCf pi’iec index in ca<:li CllUllll’y plus 2 per
ci2111,
lO
The results of ibis simulation are shown Jn Table 3.4. As can be
seen fi’om this table tile rise in real interest rates throughout the western
world ill tile 1980s had an important direct effect on the Irish public
finances. By 1985, the current budget deficit was two percentage points
higher than it would otherwise havc been directly as a resuh of the
higher world real interest rates. If account were taken of tile effcets
of the higher world interest rates on domestic interest rates and of the
eft’tees of these high interest rates on the real economy both in Ireland
and elsewhere, the effects on tile h’ish public finances (and tile lrish
economy generally) would be seen to have been much greater than
shown here. This exercise suggests that, while Irish eyes have
traditionally focussed on the transmission of external shocks to the
Irish economy through tbreign trade and investment, the effects of
economic policies pursued in Germatw, the US and the UK on
monetary phenomena have been extremely important in recent years
[br the Irish economy.
The [’act that the Irish econony generally, and tile h’ish public
finances in particular, suffered fi’om the rise in world interest rates in
Table 3.3: Average Real Interest Rates*
Ireland USA Uff (;ermany
1956-85 0.7 1.0 1.4 3.9
1970~80 -2.7 --0.6 - 1.7 2.8
1981-85 2.9 6.2 3.8 4,5
1980 --,I.0 -2.7 --6.0 2.9
1981 --2.8 2.5 1.1 4.1
1982 - 1.6 6.1 3.2 3.7
1983 4.1 7.6 5.6 4,6
1984 7.5 7.7 5.2 5,4
1985 7.4 7.2 4.0 4.7
5~uree: USA, UK and Germany: OI’~CD maill I’c.n~mfic Indicators; Irchmd: I)epartmenl o1"
I"lll~t[IC~ diHi1611 [i k,
*Lollg-lcrlll I×lnd rate less Lilt I)erccnlagC challge HI constlnlcr prices,
Table 3.4: Interest on National Foreign Debt with 2 per cent real interest rates.
ActuM Interest Rates Constant (2%I Real Interest Rates
]ttltyta’t Paymettls (,,’urlall budget ltltertsl Parmt~tl.r Curtail budget
Per cent deficit a~ per Per cent deficit as per
£,,,. of GXP cent of GNP £m. of GXP cent of GsVI"
1980 161 1.8 6.0 140 1.6 5.8
1981 249 2,3 7.4 194 1.8 6.9
1982 510 4.1 8.0 338 2.7 6.6
1983 577 4.3 7. I 446 3.3 6. I
1984 693 4.7 7. I 488 3.3 5,7
1985 783 5. I 8.2 484 3.0 6.2
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the 1980s does not mean that our economic problcms over the period
were unavoidable. Rather it highlights tile fact that in borrowing
heavily in the 1970s when interest rates were low, we left the Irish
economy very vulnerable to these external forces. If all the borrowing
of the 1970s had been undertaken at fixed interest rates for long periods
and no new borrowing had been undertaken in the 1980s clearly there
would have been no rise in debt interest payments in the 1980s as a
result of a rise in real interest rates. However, it was not possible to
obtain such financing on a large scale so that a significant part of the
Ibreign debt in 1980 was financed by variable interest rate debt. Of
much greater importance was the fact that it proved politically
impossihle to stop the rise in borrowing which commenced in the early
1970s.
3.3 The Effects of Alternative Policies on Financing the Deficit
In this section we examine two options on financing the borrowing
requirement, changes in the currency composition of the debt and the
effects of financing of the borrowing requirement with bonds bearing
differing nominal interest rates.
(o) Currency composition of the debt: In the case of foreign borrowing the
evolution of debt interest and the overall level of the debt depends on
the interest rates prevailing over the relevant period and on movements
in exchange rates. Different currency compositions give different results
as is illustrated in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Four options were tried for the
composition of all new borrowing from the end of 1979:
(i) the same composition as that of the existing debt outstanding
at end 1979,
(ii) the same composition as that of the existing debt outstanding
at end 1985,
(iii) all new borrowing in US dollars,
(iv) all new borrowing in Deutschmarks (DM).
It is not suggested that either of the last two options were a practical
possibility as borrowers do not have completely free access to different
capital markets. For example, Germany, Switzerland and the
Netherlands have, until recently at any rate, operated a queuing system
for borrowers. However, these simulations give some indication of the
effects of a limited or marginal change in the composition of borrowing
both on interest payments and on the level of debt outstanding. The
results suggest tbat if all tile new borrowing undertaken over the six-
year-period had been in dollars, tile overall interest cost to the nation
over tbat period would have been very much higher than the actual
outturn. Conversely, if borrowing had all been in DMs, the total
interest bill would bavc been much lower. Borrowing in a mixture of
currencies based on the debt outstanding at end 1979 or 1985 would
have produced a very similar interest bill to that actually observed.
However, if the differences in tbe value of the debt outstanding at the
end of 1985 arc taken into account, the picture ratber changes. When
these capital losses due to exchange rate changes arc taken into account
the actual cost of borrowing over the period is seen to be substantially
worse than either of the two alternatives which involved a mixed
composition of borrowing. This result suggests that the policy of
cbanging the mixture of currencies borrowed in each year may have
been unwise and that it might have been better to undertake the same
proportion of total borrowing in each currency over a period of years.
While the above analysis indicates that the interest bill for the six-
year period would have been much lower if all borrowing had been
in DMs it also makes clear that the interest bill would have been
much increased if all new borrowing bad been in dollars. Thus
plumping for borrowing in a single currency is in the nature of a
Table 3.5: Foreign Interest Payments with alternative Currenfy Compositions
(£ million)
Actual Interest Composition as at All in
1"ear End 1979 End 1985 US $ DM
1980 161.4 ~74.2 176.7 190.1 165.5
1981 24%4 279.6 279.5 327.0 259,7
1982 509.9 512.4 508.5 656.9 442.5
1983 577.4 552.2 559.9 708.0 476.8
1984 692.6 637.2 647.3 863.4 523.1
1985 783.0 711.1 731.0 971.7 570.1
Total 1980-85 2973.7 2866.7 2902.9 3717.1 2437.7
"Fable 3.6: Foreign Debt outstanding at end year with Alternative Currency Compositions
(£ million)
Acutual Debt Composition as at All in
)~ar End 1979 End 1985 US $ DA4
1980 2206.8 2248.4 2261.2 2271.7 2229.8
1981 3793.9 3808.7 3817.3 3884.8 3743.5
1982 5290.0 5305.9 5285.0 5475.5 5229.2
1983 7017.5 6875.0 6909.7 7448.6 6558.6
1984 7925.9 7838.0 7856.0 ¯    9033.5 7235.6
1985 8441.0 7967.3 7988.1 8056.5 7935.5
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gamble. While, with hindsight, borrowing in DMs would have been
chcaper, this ’/.,as not the perception of the world experts in 1980 as
rcfiected in interest rates. Nobody foresaw the nature of US economic
policy over thc following six years. If everybody in 1980 had expected
that the DM would be the best bet for borrowing they would have
acted accordingly. In so acting they would have altered interest rates
and exchange rates so as to wipe out the potential advantages. It is
only possible to save motley by shifting currencies if one’s forecasts for
the future are markedly better and different from those of the other
participants in the world financial system. A policy of "playing the
market" clearly involves high risks. A more appropriate approach for
the Irish government is to hedge bets by borrowing in a range of
different currcncics3 rather than gambling on tile correctness of
[brccasts of international interest rates and exchange rates. This was,
generally, the policy which was pursued over the period 1980-1986.
(b) Choice of,Nominal Interest Rates for National Loans: In financing the
borrowing requirement by sale of securities on the domestic market
the Government has the option of issuing securities with differing
nominal interest rates. If the nominal interest rate is below the current
market yield for stocks with the same maturity then they will only be
sold at a discount. The discount will make the yield on the new
securities equal to the going yield on tile market for instruments of
the same maturity. In such a case the proceeds of the sale will be less
than tile increase in the book value of tile debt. As a result, to raise
a given volume of funds, the nominal value of securities issued will
have to rise by more than the value of the funds raised as 15art of the
return to the investor is given as a capital gain.
Generally, over the past six years the borrowing requirement has
been financed by selling securities with an average nominal interest
rate well below going market yields. One of the reasons for the
cxchequcr financing part of its borrowing by giving lenders a capital
gain has been the preference of lenders for such instruments. This is
due to the fact that some lenders obtain a tax advantage in taking
part of their return in the form of a capital gain. While the use of
such instruments may have reduced the direct cost to the exchequer
of financing the borrowing requirement, it must be questioned whether
3. Clearly the range of different currencies should be drawn from different exchange rate regimes.
For example, given the similar bchaviour of the DM, tile Swiss Franc and the Netherland’s
Guilder, concentration on these three currencies should not be considered a diversified portfolio.
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this saving was more than offset by thc loss of tax revenuc due to the
reduction in tile tax I)ase.
In adopting this policy tile size of tile interest bill and, therefore,
of the borrowing requirement has been rcduced at tile expense of a
continuing capital loss resuhing in a more rapid increase in tile national
debt. If tile capital loss or gain on such transactions were taken into
account in calculating tile borrowing requirement it would be seen to
have been significantly higher over tile six-year period than is shown
using current accounting practices. As a resuh, it is important to look
at the change in tile dcbt/GNP ratio its well its tile borrowing
requirement in considering tile state of the public finances to take
account o£ tile capital loss on sale of securities (sec Honohan, 1985).
This problem Ibr the interpretation of tile state of tile public finances
is similar to that posed by capital losses on [breign borrowing due to
exchange rate changes. This policy of financing the borrowing
requirement by sale of securities with a nominal intercst well below
market yields resuhed in the interest bill in 1985 being approximately
£100 million lower than it would otherwise have been, while the debt
outstanclilag at end 1985 was around £800 million higher than ifstocks
with nominal rates at average market yields were used.
The purpose of this exercise is nol to consider what is the correct
type of instrument to be usecl for financing the borrowing requirement.
It is intendecl, rather, to show how a proper evaluation of tile public
finances must take into account not only interest payments but also
changes in tile capital value of the debt: the conventional measurcs
of the borrowing requirement do not take account of this cost.
3.4 The Domestic Demand for Government Securities
Having examined some of tile issues in determining tile supply of
different kinds of government securities, it is important to consider the
factors affecting the demand for these securities by the domestic private
sector. The [’actors affecting this demand are the level of private sector
wealth and the rates of return on the different forms of financial and
real assets available to tile private sector. Ideally this process of
determining tile demand for the different assets is amenable to
empirical examination using a consistent economic model As
mentioned earlier, to date this has not been attempted for the complete
range of assets in Ireland. (Browne and Honohan, 1983(a) and
1983(b)) concentrated on demands for the assets and liabilities of
certain financial institutions.) As a result, it is necessary to consider
15
these issues in a less formal fashion.
]:igures are not available tbr the stock of private sector weahh in
h’eland. Howcver, we do have figurcs, derived from the National
Accotmls, [br savings by the personal sector and the company sector
which give an indication of the change ill wcahh of these sectors. Using
these data and a wide range of other information, O’Connell (1986)
has prcscnted a set of flow of funds accounts fbr Ireland for tile years
1960 to 1985. These data allow us to cxamlnc the change in weahh
of the different sectors (saving) and how they allocated their saving
over the difl’crent financial and real assets. Tablc 3.7 shows the funds
awfilable to the personal and company sectors for investmcnt in
financial or physical assets over the period 1970-1985. These sources
of funds are all expressed as a percentage of GNP. The personal sector
fnnds available Ibr investment grew rapidly in the early 1970s as a
percentage of GNP. However, since 1973 they have, with two
exceptions, thllen in the range 17½ to 20½ percentage points of GNP,
indicating a Eairly stable pattern of behaviour over the second half of
the 1970s and the first halfofthc 1980s. The bulk of the funds available
to the personal sector are derived fi’om personal savings and
depreciation allowances. In the company sector the funds available
to that sector generally ranged between nine and twelve l~er cent of
GNP over the period 1970-1985.
Over the period 1980-85 slower growth in GNP meant that private
Table 3.7 Funds available to the personal and compm~ sectors, as a percentage of
G.,VI"
Personal sector fund~ Company sector funds
1970 12.7 9.0
197 [ 1 1.6 9.8
1972 14.9 9.7
19)3 17,4 10.2
1974 17.5 9.4
t975 23.9 9.0
1976 20.1 10.4
1977 19.5 10.7
1978 20.5 10.9
1979 19.2 12.1
1980 17.7 I I. I
1981 16,6 II,i
1982 19.0 9.8
1983 19.4 9.9
1984 18.4 I0,0
1985 18.9 I 1.6
Taxes on capital have been subtracted from personal sector source’s and uses of funds.
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sector wealth grew somewhat less rapidly than in the 1970s but this
slowdown was certainly not due to a change in the personal savings
ratio. Evidence from Ireland and elsewhere has suggested that high
inflation tends to result in increased savings whereas a fall in tile
inflation rate, as in the most recent years, might lead to lower savings
(Honohan, 1979 and Von Ungcrn Sternberg, 1981). High rcal interest
rates might, on the other hand, lead to a higher savings ratio (see
Summers, 1981 ). Whatever the magnitude of these effects, they appear
to have roughly cancelled each other out over the recent ),ears giving
relative stability in the pattern of personal saving.
The data presented above suggest that the increase in private sector
wealth through savings hy the personal sector, and also by the company
sector, did not show a significant change in pattern between 1980 and
1985. However, the pattern of investment made by the private sector
changed substantially in the first half of the 1980s. The proportion of
funds available to the personal sector, which were invested in physical
assets (private housing and agricuhural investment) fell significantly.
On average, between 1980 and 1986, only 38.4 per cent of personal
sector funds went into physical capital formation, whereas in the
previous six-year period the proportion was 47.2 per cent. Instead the
personal sector has substantially increased its investments in life
assurance and pension funds. It has also, as shown in Table 3.8, been
a net lender to the financial institutions every year from 1980-86.
While direct investment in government debt has tended to fall in recent
years, this tendency has been more than offset by the increased
investment by the lili: assurance and pension funds sector, all of whose
ftmds come from the personal sector. When lending to the government
through small savings is added to direct and indirect (through life
assurance) lending through purchase of government securities, the
proportion of personal sector new assets lent to the government is seen
to have increased markedly in the 1980s compared to the second half
of the 1970s. This shift away from invcstment in physical capital,
primarily housing and agricultural investment, towards investmcnt in
financial assets has probably been due to the change in the relative
rates of return on these different assets rather than to a major change
in tastes.
In the late 1970s the low real interest rates and the favourable tax
treatment of private housing made it a very attractive form of
investment to the personal sector (Irx, ine, 1984). This manifested itself
in many cases in people "trading up", moving from smaller to larger
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Tables 3.8. Personal sector use of funds as a percentage of total personal sector funds
Investment in Financial Assets
Government
Investment Direct +
in Non-Bank Insurance+Pension Funds Indirect
Physical Financial (including
Capital Total Banks Institutions Total Government Insurance) Other
1970 58.6 41.4 --47.6 21.3 18.4 0.5 19.8 30.1
1971 62,6 37.4 --66.1 19.9 20.2 6.7 29.9 40.3
1972 70.3 29.7 -22.0 17.0 19.4
- 1.8 27.8 - 14.3
1973 64.4 35.6 -4.9 8.4 19.3 1.2 11.3 2.8
1974 51.8 48.2 13.7 6.7 13.0
--2.1 9.7 3.0
1975 23.2 76.8 20.7 13.5 9.5 1.6 16.8 18.0
1976 47.4 52.6
- 14.4 13.9 10.7 5.9 20.0 28.3
1977 47.6 52.4
-- 17.4 18.4 13.5 4.3 20.1 22.1
1978 48.0 52.0 5.3 12.7 14.7 3.4 18.8 4.0
1979 60.7 39.3 --19.7 17.4 17.1 3.8 19.2 9.2
1980 39.5 60.5 6.4 16.9 17.9 3.6 22. I
1981 52.7 47.3 11.4 17.6 22.6 3.3 15. I
1982 37.9 62. I 17.8 17.1 18.6 12.4 24.9
1983 34.8 65.2
-9.8 16.5 24.7 8.5 27.9
191H 32.8 67.2 12.4 17.7 33.2 21.5 20.3
1985 28.5 71.5 0.4 18.2 33.6 22.2 35.2
0.8
-16.1
-4.0
14.4
5.0
6.3
Taxes on capital have been subtracted from personal sector sources and uses of funds.
Purchases of government debt by the banking sector are excluded from indirect purchases by the personal sector.
houses. In manufacturing industry the cost of capital was very low
(FitzGerald, 1983). At the same time the real rate of return in financial
assets such as government debt was very low (see Table 3.3). This
low real rate of interest encouraged borrowing from the financial sector
to finance a higher rate of capital accumulation.
In the 1980s the returns from invesmlcnt in housing have fallen as
the price of houses has not kept pace with inflation. The cost of capital
needed to finance house purchase has risen greatly in real terms. For
manufacturing industry the cost of capital in the period 1981 to 1983
was twice that in the five years 1975-80 while the rate of profit showed
no such increase. The lower rate ofincorne growth in agriculture and
general deterioration in the prospects for agricultural incomes has
reduced the prospective rate of return on investment. By contrast the
real rate of interest on government securities (and other financial assets)
has reached record levels (see Table 3.3). This changed the relative
rates of return on real and financial assets. The personal sector and
company sector responded by cutting physical capital formation and
substituting investment, directly and indirectly, in government debt
and i~ct lending to the banking system. Tbis tendency was particularly
marked in the 1983 to 1985 period.
Traditionally the banking system has been one of the major investors
in government securities. At the end of 1979 over a quarter of the
national loans outstanding were held by that sector. The Central Bank
requires the banking system to hold a certain proportion of its assets
in the form of goverment securities. This required holding together
with actual holdings of government securities is shown in Table 3.9
for 1979-1985. From end 1979 up to the end of 1982 the banks
generally held the minimum required level of government debt. How-
ever, from 1983 to the end of 1985 the banking system acquired
substantially more government securities than were required by their
secondary liquidity ratio. While this excess holding was reduced in
the first half of 1986 the pattern of investments by the banking system
reflects the fact that expected returns from lending to the government
rose dramatically with the rise in real interest rates and the fall off in
private commercial activity. The rise in interest rates on government
securities resulted in a rise in interest rates for lending to the non-
bank private sector, choking off demand for such lending. Thus the
growth in lending by the banking system to the government in the
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1983-1985 period came about more because of the change in pro-
spective rates of return on different assets than because of the growth
in tile asset base of the banking system.
Table 3.10 shows tile sales of Irish government securities denomi-
nated in h’ish pounds to tile rest of tile world. As can bc seen, there
were significant sales in the 1975 to 1978 period, partly due to [b, lse
expectations about tile future movement of exchange rates. Generally
over tile following four years some of these securities were sold hack
by foreigners. However, in 1983, 1984 and 1985 there were, once
again, some net sales to foreigners, albeit on a very much smaller
scale. However, the fact that such sales took place reflects the fact
that the rate of return on such securities was attractive to some Ibrcign
investors.
In addition to the change in relative rates orreturn a further factor
which may have affected the demand for government securities in
recent years is a ehauge in the distribution of income. As indicated
in Table 3.8 the 1980s saw a substantial increase in the role or life
assurance companies and pension funds. The build up in the assets of
Table 3.9: Banks’ Holdings of Govenmzent Securities (£ Million)
Bank J" Banks~
End ~’ear required actual
holding holding
1979 975 1,005
1980 1,163 1,147
1981 1,369 1,340
1982 1,475 1,491
1983 1,623 1,909
1984 1,795 2,186
1985 1,865 21512
Table 3.10: Net Foreign Purchases of Irish Government Securities (£ Million)
1970 0.0
1971 O.0
1972 9.7
1973 5.8
1974 13.7
1975 75.6
1976 0.0
1977 129.0
1978 300.0
1979
-50.0
1980 17.0
1981
-30.0
1982
-18.0
1983 35.0
1984 70.0
1985 84.0
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this sector meant that an increasing proportion of the income of the
personal sector derived from its investments is channelled through the
insurance/pension fund sector. The very high real rates of return on
government securities and the extensive government borrowing, doc-
umented earlier in this chapter, has meant that tbere has been a rapid
increase in the 1980s in domestic payments of national debt interest
and consequently in the cash flow of this sector. Given the pattern of
boldings of government securities a substantial part of this income has
found its way initially into such institutions. As tbese assets are the
property of the personal sector, fi’om a national accounting point of
view, this income is treated as personal income. However, in many
cases the indirect owners of these assets, the personal sector, may only
become aware of tbe high rate of return ira recent years when the
insurance policies or pensions become payable. In the interim the
financial institutions will re-invest all the income accruing from the
financial assets. While many other factors affect the rate of saving,
the combination of the growth ira the importance of this mecbanism
in recent years and the high rates of returra on financial instruments
may have imparted an upward bias to personal savings. The growth
in personal incomes of owners of insurance policies or pension rights
may thus haves been higher than they perceived and their rate of
savings consequently bigher than it would otherwise have beera. The
preference of tbese financial institutions for investing in government
securities in recent years has meant that interest payments have gen-
erally been re-invested in new government securites.
3.5: Conclusions
A review of the stance of fiscal policy over the 1980-85 period is
contained in Bacon, (1986). Both at the time, and looking back with
the benefit of hindsight, the problems of the economy over that period
have been diagnosed. Generally, the stance of fscal policy was much
too relaxed, especially given the very high balance of payments deficit
over the period. As a result, huge borrowing was undertaken abroad,
giving rise to the rapid increase in interest payments documented in
section 3.2. Whether fiscal policy should have been tightened by cuts
in expenditure oz" higher taxation may still be a matter for debate but
the taihn’e to do either resuhed ira the economy running at a higher
level of activity in the early 1980s than was desirable given tbe large
current balance of payments deficit. Evidence from many sources (e.g.
Bradley, ct al., 1985, FitzGerald and Keegan, 1982) indicates that the
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higher level of activity was transitory in nature. The cost in terms of
output foregone in later years to pay the interest on the debt incurred
has been substamial. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the
appropriate stance of fiscal policy but rather to take it as given and
examine the implications for financial markets and monetary policy
of the manner in which the borrowing requirement was financed.
The magnitude of the growth in debt has meant that any decisions
on how it is financed have had major domestic economic implications.
As indicated in Chapter 2, prior to 1979, given a fixed and certain
exchange rate, the financing of the deficit would have had no effect
on domestic interest rates. The domestic private sector would have
chosen its level of investment in government securities given externally
determined interest rates, and the residual financing would have been
carried out externally. However, with the introduction of uncertainty
concerning the future value of the Irish pound, consequent on joining
the EMS, this situation was altered. As discussed in Chapter 2, there
was now some scope for domestic policy to vary Irish interest rates
around a long-term trend which was still essentially externally deter-
mined. Under these circumsmces the volume of debt to he financed
could be expected to put limited upward pressure on domestic interest
rates as the government bid funds away from alternative uses. The
actual outturn in the years 1980-82 was rather difli:rent. Strenuous
efforts were made to keep down domestic interest rates both by direct
exchequer foreign borrowing and by encouraging semi-state bodies
such as the ICC and the ACC to do the same. While lower interest
rates naturally had some beneficial effects on the level of activity in
the short term, these advantages were bought at the price of future
economic growth.4 At a time when the current balance of payments
deficit was extremely high, this policy was especially inappropriate.
In addition, the policy of keeping domestic interest rates down by
borrowing abroad, if anything, raised the cost of this borrowing to
the exchequer due to the higher yields payable. While these factors
all suggest that monetary policy should have been tighter in the early
1980s than was actually the case, the scope for such a tightening should
not be exaggerated. If the government had attempted to raise a sub-
stantially larger proportion of its funds domestically the net result
would have been a substantial capital inflow attracted by a limited
rise in interest rates above their actual observed levels.
4. Debt interest paymems paid abroad reduce the level of GNP.
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In 1984 and 1985 the economic situation was somewhat different.
The current balance of payments deficit was falling as a percentage
of GNP and the level of domestic economic activity was low. In spite
of these circumstances which might have suggested an easing of mon-
etary policy, the rigid adherence to a domestic financing target for
the exchequer borrowing requirement at the end of 1984 resulted in
a substantial rise in Irish interest rates, against the trend of rates
elsewhere, with consequential effects on domestic economic activity.
The rise in interest rates was such that it attracted foreign capital
inflows in early 1985 which tended to push interest rates back down
indicating that the upward pressure on domestic interest rates from
deht financing policy had reached a limit. A marginal shift of bor-
rowing from domestic to foreign sources, which would have been
required to avoid the rise in domestic interest rates, would, ifanything,
have reduced the direct interest cost to the exchequer of borrowing
over those years. Taken together, these factors would suggest that a
less rigid adherence to a domestic funding target would have been
appropriate.
23
Chapter 4
NATIONAL DEBT AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1986-1990
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines a number ofdifl’erent factors whicb will affect
the growth of the national debt over the period 1986-1990 and con-
siders how the financing of this debt will affect the economy over that
period. Section 4.2 discusses the economic outlook for the rest of tile
decade. Because of uncertainty concerning many asepcts of this outlook
two different sets of assumptions are considered for the future time
path of interest rates and exchange rates and for the public sector
borrowing requirement. Section 4.3 examines the future growth in the
national debt and in the cost of servicing that debt under tbe different
sets of assumptions. Section 4.4 considers tbe likely domestic demand
for government debt and in Section 4.5 the implications for interest
rates, and the monetary sector generally, of the prospective supply of
and demand Ibr government debt are considered.
4.2 Assumptions Concerning Economic Outlook
Since the Medium Term Outlook: 1986.-1990 prepared by Bacon was
published early in 1986 quite a number of important factors have
changed which must affect the future prospects for the h’isb economy.
In addition, as highlighted in that publication, there were, and still
are, considerable uneertaintiess about the future course of fiscal policy
which must be taken into account in any examination of the likely
trend in the national debt over time. To deal with these problems
Bacon’s numbers have been revised in line with the latest forecasts in
the August 1986, Quarterly Economic Commentary and the impact of the
different sets of assumptions concerning fiscal policy and interest rates
on tbe national debt bas been examined. The results, while not pro-
riding a firm forecast of the future, illustrate the sensitivity of any
forecast of trends in the national debt to differing sets of circumstances.
The areas where considerable uncertainty exists and where the
effects of alternative sets of assumptions have been examined are the
public finances and the future course of real interest rates. In addition,
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while no attempt is made to use alternative sets of assumptions con-
cerning the future course of the balance of payments, the factors giving
rise to uncertainty in this area are also discussed.
The henchmark scenario ill Bacon, (1986), adopts the standard
technical assumption of a neutral budget. (Tile adoption of such a
basis implies no normative statement concerning the appropriate
stance of fiscal policy.) This assumptiou implies no volume changc in
public expenditure and no change in tax rates or tax hands. While
to economists this appears a reasonable set of assumptions, in the
context of the structure of pubfic expenditure in Ireland today tile
resuhing exchequer borrowing requirement involves significant deci-
sions to cut levels of services (or increase rates of taxation). This is
due to tile fact that, partly for demographic reasons, there is a trend
increase in expenditure. For examplc, in the case of eduction, due to
tile age structure of tile population, maintenance of tile current level
of service, class size, etc., will require increasing expenditure well imo
the next decade. To make room for this expenditure within a neutral
budget there would have to be decisions to cut services elsewhere or
to increase tax rates. The problems in achieving such a target have
been further aggravated by the budgetary overrun in 1986.5 Any
departure from this restrictive stance would considerably alter the
picture in thc benchmark projection. It would increase tile government
borrowing requirement, and, of necessity, require somewhat higher
domestic interest rates. The interest cost of the additional borrowing
would, as in tile past, aggravate tile long-term impact on the National
Debt. The higher interest rates would reduce domestic activity and,
therefore, tax revenue. As indicatcd in FitzGerald, 1985, such a domes-
tic stimulus would give a boost to imports leading to a substantial
deterioration in the balance of payments. In turn, this would put
further pressure on domestic interest rates. The pessimistic alternative
of a more relaxed fiscal stance was examined in Bacon, (1986). Tile
implications of such a policy for the national debt and debt interest
payments are explored here as an alternative to tile more restrictive
benchmark (or neutral budget) scenario. Full details of the assumptions
concerning how the exchequer borrowing requirement is financed are
given in Appendix 4..
A second major area of uncertainty concerns the future course of
interest rates and exchange rates. In particular, uncertainty concerning
5. The hudgelaW ow:rrun of 1986 h:ls not been bui[I inlo the benchmark ligurcs for I~rmwing
ill Ihe medium term.
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future US economic policy and its effects on the US budget deficit
makes any forecast of interest rates extremely problematic. With this
in mind, two different sets of assumptions have been used. In the
benchmark case there is assumed to be a fall in interest rates over the
rest of the decade to a 2 per cent real rate together with some con-
tinuing small adjustment of exchange rates. The alternative assumption
invo)ves holding interest rates and exchange rates for lrelahd and
other countries unchanged at their immediate post-devaluation level
ofearly August 1986. This implies the continuation ofhigh real interest
rates, both at home and abroad, for the rest of the decade. While the
assumption of uncltanged interest rates is not fully consistent with the
assumption of fixed exchange rates and a low inflation rate, it provides
a useful alternative to the benchmark assumption of falling interest
rates. It gives some indication of how Ireland might be affected by
unfavourable developments in the world financial sector. Full details
of these assumptions are given in Appendix 4.
The third major area of uncertainty concerns future movements in
the balance of payments. In the past, the most obvious problem for
forecasting has been the unreliability of the actual figures. If reliance
had been placed on the balance of payments’ figures prior to the
discovery of the "Black Hole" in 1983, the policies adopted might
have been even more inappropriate than they were. Similarly, if the
recent large unexplained outflow on the balance of payments were to
persist in the future one would have to guard against the possibility
that the figures did not reflect the underlying problems of the Irish
economy. However, it is the author’s view, that the balance of pay-
ments’ figures currently available form a reasonably firm basis for
developing filture economic policy. Even though the precise details of
the recent private capital outflow may not be fully understood, the
figures should give a reliable indication of the trend in the related
balances on capital and current accounts.
Without details of the composition of the large private capital out-
flow in the last quarter of 1985 and the first half of 1986, it is difficult
to assess its full significance. While the Deposit Interest Retention Tax
contributed to this outflow, it is probable that fears about the position
of the Irish pound within the EMS were of greater importance.
The combination of a perceived loss of competitiveness together
with the actual stance of fiscal policy adopted over the period gave
rise to fears concerning the position of the Irish pound within the
EMS. These fears were partially validated by the developments over
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the year which made short-term investment abroad more pro/itable,
both ex-ante and ex-post, than investment in domestic financial assets.
For time future these private capital flows will remain volatile, being
rcspol~sive to changes i1~ factors affecting the exchange rate. If the
benchmark scenario were adopted with a tight fiscal policy stance, a
maintenance of competitiveness within the I’2MS and a continuing
improvement in time balance of payments on current account, it is
likely that these capital outflows would be very much lower than in
the recent past. Conversely, a failure to adopt such a fiscal policy
stance would encourage [’urther capital outflows, putting pressure on
domestic interest rates, with consequential effects for the real economy.
Unccrtai.nty concerning time future course of the current balance of
payments can be examined under three headings: the tcrnls of trade;
the volume of exports; and the propensity to import. In the case of
the terms of trade facing Ireland, due to the fall in oil prices, there
has ah’cady been a major change since Bacon’s henchmark projection
was drawn up. While it may well be a temporary phenomenon, it
should give some significant boost to activity in Ireland’s export mar-
kcts if not this year, then in 1987 or 1988. These effects have been
taken i~lo account in the recent Quarterly Economic Commentary
forecasts for 1986 and 1987 and suitable adjustments have heen made
to the benchmark [brccast of Bacon for those years. The benchmark
projection also made ccrtaln assumptions concerning the terms of trade
for agricultural produce. However, as outlined in O’Connor, (1986),
the future for agricuhural exports and EEC subsidies is extremely
uncertain due to the prospect of continuing surpluses in the major
food products. Dependillg on what happens to thc CAP over the next
five years the terms of trade for agricuhural produce could be signif-
icantly worse than assumed here with consequential effects on the
balance of payments, GNI~ and domestic savings.
The assumptions in Bacon concerning the future trend in the volume
of exports seemed quite reasonable by comparison with the perform-
ancc i~1 the first half of the decade. Under relatively tmfavourable
world conditions total exports rose iz~ volume by an average of over
8 per cent a year between 1980 and 1985. However, this growth was
driven by Ihe increase in industrial capacity which continued to grow
well into the 1980s. The low level of investment in more recent years
may mean that the capacity to support a similar increase in the second
half of the decade is not. present. (Of course, to the extent that the
growth in exports proves slower than expected the outflow of profits
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aod dem,and for ray., material imports ".’.,ill also show slower growth.)
The third area where some uueertainty may ¢xsist is over the pro-
penshy to import. However, FitzGerald, (1985), suggests that tilt rising
propensity to import, observed h~ cartier decades, ’was due to a nund)er
of Ihclors which may not be prcseut in the late 1980s. In particular,
Ihc continuing fiscal slinluhls over the 1970s together with freeing of
trade in Ibod, accounted tbr a significant part of the rapid increase
in imports up to 1980. Provided that no stimulus to domestic demand
is given by fiscal policy and that there is no major change in com-
petitiveness, it is unlikely that a significant deterioration in tile current
balance o1" payments situation will emanate from a surge in imports.
On balance, this cxamination of the prospects for tile current balance
of payments suggests that, while Bacon’s ligures coukl be on tile opti-
mistic side, provided there is no fiscal stimulus to the economy, there
should be, at worst, no dcterioration in tilt current situation and,
i~robably, there should be some [hrther iml~rovement. As a resuh,
[:laeoc,’s figures, adjusted as described above, have been used as a basis
fi~r tilt analysis described in tile rest of tile paper.
In tile rest of this chapter tbur difl’crcut scenarios are examiued
corresponding to the neutral and high public sector borrowing options
aucl the declining and fixed interest rate assumptions. The benchmark
set of assunlptions, roughly consistellt with Bacon’s benchmark seen-
ario, involve a neutral fiscal policy and declining interest rates. Full
details of the numbers underlying these scenarios are given in Appendix
4.
4..3 Future Trends in the .JValional Debt and Debt Interest
These [bur sets of assumptions were [bd into tilt debt simulation
model described in Appendix I and tilt resuhing estimates of national
debt interest and debt outstanding over tile period are shown in Table
,t.I. A breakdown of these results into Ibreign and domestic debt is
shown in Tables ’1.2 and 4.3 respectively. The benchnlark run with
declining interest rates corresponds most elose]y to the benchmark
projection of Bacon. (However, as outlined later, there are some qual-
ifications to this ill the area of interest rates.) As can be seen fi’om
Tal)le 4.1 and Figure 4.1, under tile benchmark set of asssumptions
(neutral budget, declining interest rates) the key nationzd debt GNP
ratio peaks in 1987 and declines thereafter. From 1988 to 1990 the
ratio falls, ahhough even in 1990 it is only back to the level for the
current year (1968). This level is very high by the standards of Western
28
Europe (Chouraclui
, 
.Jones and Montador, 1986). The prospect for
debt interest payments is for very little change ill absolute terms over
the rest of the clccade giving a gradual declinc as a percentage of
GNP. This decline ill interest payments occurs in spite of the continuing
high level of borrowing and is purely due to the assumed fidl in interest
rates. Once interest rates reach their assumed minimunl in 1988, the
interest payments begin to rise again in absolute terms though still
showing a small fall as a percentage of GNP.
Table 4.2 shows the trend in the ratio of foreign debt to GNP. On
the benchmark asumptions, with nct foreign borrowing tapering off;
this ratio declines giving a rapid fall in foreign debt interest payments
rclatlve to GNP. This contrasts with tile experience of the first half
of thc decade when the continuing rise in foreign debt interest pay-
ments knocked an average of 1 per cent a },cat" off tile growth rate of
GNP (Bacon, 1986)
Even tile moderate fiscal stimulus assumed in the "high" borrowing
option is enough to give a continuing rise in the debt/ONP ratio into
thc foreseeable futurc. This option is clearly explosive in that tile clebt/
GNP ratio would reach a totally unsustainable level if such a course
were pursued indefinitely. Tile magnitude of this problem is to some
extent masked by tile trcnd in debt interest payments which continues
Table 4.1 Total Debt Outstanding and Total National Debt laterest, 1985-
1990
Benchmark Borrowing
(aVeutral Budget) Itigh Borrowing
I’ear Dtdining Fixed Declining P~xed
Interest Rates Interest Rates Interest Rates Interest Rates
£.~. % c,’Ne £,~. % c, NI, £~. % c;~Vl, £.,. % cNf,
Total Debl Outstanding
1985 18,857 123.6
1986 21,025 128.0
1987 22,897 132.4
1988 24,530 130.5
1989 26,370 130.4
1990 27,944 127.6
Total National Debt Interest
1985 1,856 12.2
1986 1,824 I1.1
1987 L831 10.6
1988 1,845 9.8
1989 1,855 9.2
1990 1,928 8.8
1,856
1,834
1,923
2,084
2,217
2,377
18,857 123.6
21,025 128.0
22,960 132.8
24,889 132.4
27,532 137.4
29,965 139.4
12.2 1,856
11.2 1,824
II,I 1,838
I I, I 1,856
I 1.0 1,892
10.9 2,006
12.2
I1.1
10.6
9.9
9.4
9.3
1,856 12.2
1,834 11.2
1,925 I I. I
2.097 11.2
2,263 I 1.3
2,475 11,5
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Table 4.2. Foreign Debt Outstanding and National Debt Interest on Foreign Debt,
1985-1990
Benchmark Borrowing
(Neutral Budget) High Borrowing
Fear Declining Fixed Declining Fixed
Interest Rates Interest Rates Interest Rates Interest Rates
£m. % GNP £m. % GNP £m. % GaVP £m. % GJVP
Foreign Debt Outstanding
1985 8,441 55.3
1986 9,348 56.9
1987 9,827 56.3
1988 9,922 52.8
1989 10,302 51.0
1990 10,375 47.4
National Debt [ntercst
1985 783
1986 684
1987 653
1988 627
1989 591
1990 594
8,441 55.3
9,348 56.9
9,791 56.6
10,281 54.7
I 1,464 57.2
12,496 58.1
on Foreign Debt
5.1 783 5.1 783 5.1 783 5.1
4.2 684 4.2 684 4.2 684 4.2
3.8 666 3.9 655 3.8 668 3.9
3.3 682 3.6 638 3.4 695 3.7
2.9 680 3.4 628 3.1 726 3.6
2.7 686 3.1 672 3.1 784 3.6
Table 4.3. Domestic Debt Outstanding and National Debt Interest on Domestic Debt.
1985-1990
Benchmark Borrowing
(Neutral Budget) High Borrowing
Year Declining Fixed Declining Fixed
Interesl Rates Interest Rates Interesl Rates Interest Rates
£,.. % cycP £m. % cJcp £m. % CJCP £.,. % Cm"
Domestic Debt Outstanding
1985 10,416 68.2 10,416 68.2
1986 11,677 71.1 11,677 71.1
1987 13,169 76.2 13,169 76.2
1988 14,608 77.7 14,608 77.7
1989 16,068 80.2 16,068 80.2
1990 17,569 81.7 17,569 81.7
National Debt Interest on Domestic Debt
1985 1,073 7.0 1,073 7.0 1,073 7.0 1,073
1986 1,140 6.9 1,150 7.0 1,140 6.9 1,150
1987 1,178 6.8 1,257 7.3 1,178 6.8 1,257
1988 1,218 6.5 1,402 7.5 1,218 6.5 1,402
1989 1,264 6.3 1,537 7.6 1,264 6.3 1,537
1990 1,334 6.1 1,691 7.8 1,334 6.2 1,691
7.0
7.0
7.3
7.5
7.7
7.9
3O
to decline as a percentage of GNP. This is purely due to the assumed
decline in nominal interest rates. Once these rates level off, interest
payments begin to rise in absolute terms (from 1988) and would begin
¯ I
to rnse as a percentage of GNP from 1991 onwards.
In simulating the effects of fixed interest rates no attempt was made
to simulate the effects of these high interest rates on the major economic
aggregates other than debt interest. To do so would require a major
exercise with a suitable macro-economic model. The results should be
interpreted in this figbt. In addition no account was taken of the need
to finance the additional interest payments consequent on the higher
interest rates. If they were financed by borrowing an indication of the
effect on the debt/GNP ratio can be obtained by adding the cumulative
difference between the two sets of interest payments, expressed as a
percentage of GNP, to the debt/GNP ratios of the declining interest
rates option. In the case of the Neutral budget assumption this would
suggest that the debt/GNP ratio would peak in 1989 at over 134 per
Fig. 4. I Debt GNP Ratio (%) Under Different Borrowing Assumptions
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cent of GNP. In the case of the "high" borrowing assumption the
debt/GNP ratio would rise even more explosively to over 145 per cent
of GNP by 1990.
The unchanged interest rates assumption, not surprisingly, leads to
a continuing rise in interest payments in nominal terms as tile level
of indebtedness rises. In the case of the neutral budget option~ debt
interest payments remain almost constant as a percentage of GNP
while under the high borrowing assumptions they rise from 1987
onwards,                                 t
The conclusions to be drawn from these simulations are:
(i) Provided that fiscal policy is restrained to the degree implicit in
the neutral budget scenario, the crucial debt/GNP ratio will begin
to fall before the end of the decade. This will occur even if interest
rates remain high, though the situation would obviously be
improved by a return to the lower real interest rates experienced
in the past.
(ii) If there is a moderate fiscal expansion, on the lines set out in
Appendix 4, even with falling interest rates, the national debt
continues on the explosive course which it is on currently. With
fixed interest rates the deterioration is all the more rapid.
Simulations were also carried out to examine the effects of alternative
compositions of borrowing. In particular, in the benchmark scenario
the cost to the exchequer of financing differing proportions of the debt
by foreign borrowing was examined. However, given the internally
consistent6 nature of the declining interest rate assumptions, any
change in composition has little or not effect on the exchequer cost,
though they obviously have different implicaitons for the management
of the monetary sector of the economy.
4.4 Demand for Government Securities in the Medium Term
In the absence of a quantitative model which explains how the
private sector manages its portfolio of assets it is difficult to forecast
the likely demand for government securities over the next five years.
The factors which will be crucial in determining the demand for these
securities will be firstly the change in the wealth of the private sector
through savings. Secondly, the demand for different assets, real and
financial, will be affected by the expected rates of return on the dif-
ferent assets. (The level of savings may itself be affected by those rates
6, Generally interst differentials are equal to the a.,,sumed annual rate of change in exchange
rates.
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of return.) Thirdly, the demand for certain types of assets may be
afl’ected by the distribution of income. These factors are each consid-
ered in turn in the discussion which follows.
While the demand for different assets should ideally be examined
in the context of the level of private sector weahh, suitable data are
not available. Instead the first part of this exercise involves an exam-
ination of the likely effects of a change in wealth due to the level of
savings in the benchmark scenario (neutral budget, declining interest
rates). Table 4.4 shows the personal sector funds available for invest-
ment expressed as a percentage of GNP. These funds are equal to the
total of personal savings and depreciation adjusted for capital transfers.
As can be seen from this table, the benchmark scenario assumes that
the proportion of GNP accounted for by those funds changes little
over the period 1984 to 1990. These funds are available for investment
by the personal sector in either financial assets or real assets. Table
4.5 gives thc breakdown of the allocation of these funds into physical
capital formation (residential building and agricultural investment)
and the acquisition of financial assets. The proportion devoted to direct
investment by the personal sector fell repidly from 1981 to 1985 and
is assumed to stabilize at roughly the 1985 level for the rest of the
decade. This drastic change in the use of the funds available to the
private sector, which was commented on in the previous chapter, was
brought about, at least in part, by a change in the cost of capital and
in the relative rates of return on real and financial assets. If, as is
assumed in the benchmark scenario, real interest rates fall significantly
towards the average levels experienced over the last thirty years, the
relative rates of return on fxed assets and financial assets will be altered
in favour of investment in physical capital. In this case it must be
questioned whether the estimated breakdown between physical and
financial assets, shown in Table 4.5 is realistic. It is probable that the
unchanging pattern of use of funds shown in that table for the rest of
the decade is more consistent with a level of interest rates somewhere
between the "declining" and "fixed" interest rates scenarios.
In Table 4.5 domestic borrowing by the government is expressed
as a percentage of the total acquisition of financial assets by the
personal sector over the period 1980-1990. With the exception of 1981,
government borrowing between 1980 and 1985 accounted for between
58 per cent and 65 per cent of the total acquisition of financial assets
by the personal sector. The assumptions concerning the financing of
the exchequer borrowing requirement in 1986, while consistent with
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Table 4.4. Source and use of funds by the personal and company sectors as a percentage of GNP
Personal sector Company sector
Investment in lnvtstment in
Source of funds Physical Capital Balance Source of Funds Physical Capital Balance
1980 17.7 7.0 10.7 11.1 19.3
-8.2
1981 16.6 8.8 7,9 11.1 18.8 -7.7
1982 19.0 7.2 I 1.8 9.8 16.6 -6.8
1983 19.4 6.8 12.7 9.9 16.0 --6.1
1984 18.4 6.0 12.3 lO.O 16.9 --6.9
1985 18.9 5.4 13.5 II .6 15.6 --4.0
1986 18.4 5.1 13.3 10.8 13.5
--2.7
1987 18.3 5.4 12.9 10,4 13.8
--3.4
1988 19.3 5.2 14.1 10.9 14.1
--3.2
1989 18.6 5.1 13.5 11.6 14.8
--3.2
1990 18.3 5.0 13.3 12.7 15.9
--3.3
Taxes on capilal have been sublracled from personal s~zcior sourccs and uses of funds.
Table 4.5. Personal sector z)lvestment zTl physical and financzT# assets.
Investment in financial Governmtmt domestic Go~ernment domeltic
Physltal investment assets borrowing borrowing
% of total funds % of total funds % of total funds % of inveatmtnt in
auailable
~vailable available financial assets
1980 39.5 60,5 39.5 65.4
1981 52.7 47.3 20.5 43.4
1982 37.9 62.1 38.1 58.1
1983 34.8 65.2 38.0 58,3
1984 32.8 67.2 39.9 59.4
1985 28.5 71,5 46.6 65.1
1986 27.8 72.2 44.9 62.2
1987 29.6 70.4 49.5 70.4
1988 28+ I 72.9 43.5 59.6
1989 27.5 72.5 39.8 54.9
1990 27.2 72.8 38.6 53.0
Taxes on capital have b¢cll sublractcd from I.~rsona] sector sources alld uses of futlds.
this pattern, are clearly no longer attainable, For 1987 the assumed
domestic exchequer borrowing would account for 70 per cent of the
personal sector’s financial assets. Even under normal conditions this
is probably too high. However, any change in the assumed composition
of borrowing for that year would not significandy affect the figures
in the previous section. From 1988 onwards exchequer borrowing
would account for a rapidly falling share of personal sector funds
leaving a large volume of funds seeking other forms of financial assets.
As shown in Table 4.4 the company sector’s borrowing requirement,
expressed as a percentage of GNP, is also assumed to remain at a low
level for the rest ofthe decade. As a result, Lhe possiblility oftransferring
spare personal sector funds to the company sector from 1988 onwards,
through time medium of the banking system or other financial insti-
tutions, would be small. This result is reflected in the growing balance
of payments surplus envisaged for the years 1988-1990. In this scenario,
there would be a shortage of domestic borrowers in 1989 and 1990
given the volume of funds available for investment in financial assets
and given assumed interest rates. Even with the government funding
mosl of its borrowing domestically, it would not be able to absorb all
the available funds. This mis-match between the domestic supply and
demand for funds could only be resolved by a capital outflow or by
a change in the flows of funds and private sector demand for them
induced by a change in interest rates, an issue considered in the next
section.
So far the mechanism whereby the personal sector’s funds find their
way into public sector debt have not been considered. In the previous
chapter the growth in the importancc of the fife assurance and pension
funds in the period up to 1985 was documented (see Tablc 3.9).
Between 1983 and 1985 the proportion of total personal sector funds
invested in these institutions ranged from a quarter to a third. These
institutions, in turn, invested the bulk of their funds in government
securities. For the future, the range of opportunities for investment
open to these institutions will, on the basis of the benchmark scenario,
remain largely confined to government securities and foreign invest-
merit, the company sector deficit continuing at a low level.
In the case of the banking system, while it commenced 1986 with
a substantially higher holding of government securities than was
required by secondary liquidity requirements, it had substantially
reduced this holding by mid-year. However, the forces which gave
rise to this increase in the share of bank resources devoted to such
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securities in 1984 and 1985 are, on the basis of the benchmark scenario,
likely to continue for the rest of the decade. The tendency for the
personal sector to increase its deposits with the fnancial institutions
more rapidly than its borrowing from them, which was apparent in
the 1983-5 period, should continue into the future. Similarly, the
borrowing requirement of the company sector is assumed to remain
at a low level leaving banks with the choice of lending to the gov-
ernment or lending abroad. As a resuh, the banking sector is likely
to continue to absorb a significant portion of the new government
securities created in the medium term.
A final factor which may influence the dcmand for financial assets
and possibly even the level of personal sector savings is the distribution
of income in the economy. Given the development of the financial
sector over the first half of the 1980s, an increasing proportion of
domestically held governmcnt debt is lodged in the portfolios of the
financial institutions, especially insurance companies and pension
fitnds. The corollary of this is that an increasing proportion of domestic
national debt interest will be paid directly to these institutions while,
in national accounting terms, being deemed to have been paid to the
uhimate owners of these funds, the personal sector. With real interest
rates at unprecedented levels these investments are much more prof-
itable than at any time over the last thirty years. In addition, on the
basis of the interest rate assumptions for the future, considerable capital
gains should accrue to them in the next two or three years. However,
given the modus operandi of these institutions the investors are only likely
to receive this increased rate of return as disposable income at some
date in the future. In many cases they may not even be aware of just
how profitable these investment have been and, as a result, may not
adjust their savings patterns for some time to come leaving actual
personal savings above the level they might otherwise have been. As
well as possibly biasing upwards the rate of savings the high domestic
national debt interest payments represent a stream of funds available
for ,’einvestment. Over the rest of the 1980s the national debt interest
paid at home will be equal to approximately 70 to 85 per cent of the
total domestic borrowing requirement of the government sector, pro-
viding a ready demand for new government securities in the absence
of ahcrnative assets.
Under the high borrowing option the picture is very different. By
1990 the exchequer borrowing requirement (EBR) is almost £1,000
million above the benchmark. If all of this ilacrement were financed
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domestically it would absorb nearly all the personal sector funds avail-
able for investment in financial assets. Clearly, this would not be
feasible and, as a result in the simulations described above, it is assumed
that all tbe additional borrowing over and above the benchmark EBR
is financed abroad. This need to resort to additional foreign borrowing
is reflected in the deterioration in the current balance of payments
position estimated for this option compared to the benchmark (see
Appendix 4). Compared to tile benchmark, where the domestic supply
of funds is greater titan the domestic demand, under this option the
financing of the EBR would absorb all available domestic funds. In
addition, its effects on private capital flows would further tighten tile
domestic market tbr funds, maintaining upward pressure on the domes-
tic interest rate.
Any cbange in tile assumed current balance of payments position
would clearly affect the availability of funds for investment in gov-
ernment debt. Ifexports proved less buoyant than predicted or if there
was a serious deterioration in tbe agricuhural terms of trade, the
availability of personal sector funds for investment in financial assets
would be substantially reduced compared to the figures underlying
Tables 4.4 and 4.5. Naturally, any improvement in tile balance of
payments position over and above that assumed in the benchmark
would lead to an increase in funds for investment while, if anytbing,
reducing tile public sector’s funding needs.
4.5 Interest Rates and the Real Economy
Under tbe bencbmark proiection the potential imbalance in the
demand for funds highlighted above will be ironed out either by
changes in tbe real economy, resulting in lower savings and higber
investment, or else through an increased capital outflow as the private
sector invests abroad. The relative importance of these mechanisms
will depend on two factors. Firstly, as outlined in Chapter 2, it will
be affected by the degree to which interest rates are determined by
internal financial conditions. Secondly, ira so far as domestic real inter-
est rates are determined by world interest rates it wlfl depend on
developments ira financial conditions in the rest of the world.
If tile Irish financial markets were totally insulated from world
markets the effect of any excess supply of funds, as envisaged ira the
benchmark projection for the late 1980s, would be to drive down
interest rates until either personal sector savings fell or investment rose
to take up tile slack. This would, in turn, reduce tile current balance
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of payments surplus. However, as outlined in Chapter 2, the Irish
financial sector is only insulated from the rest of the world to a limited
extent by uncertainty about the exchange rate. If tile national debt
were seen to be coming under control and the current account of the
bahmce of payments were favourable, as envisaged in the benchmark
scenario, uncertainty concerning the exchange rate would be min-
imiscd. Under these conditions the effect of an excess supply of domestic
funds would be to keep domestic interest rates at the lower bound of
tile relatively narrow band within wbich they are internally deter-
mined. The mid-point of this band will, as heretofore, be determined
by foreign real interest rates. If world real interest rates were to remain
at a high level, as impllcd by the fixed interest rate scenario, domestic
savings and investment would continue to generate a surplus of funds
for investment in financial assets. Given tile limited demand Ibr such
funds in tile late 1980s under the benchmark (neutral budget) pro-
jection, the residual would flow abroad as increased private sector
investnlent. However, if world real interest rates were to fall as envis-
aged in tile declining interest rate scenario, domestic real interest rates
would fall too. The effect of this would be to change the relative rates
of return on financial and real assets back to tile position at the end
of the 1970s or early 1980s. This in turn would lead to increased
domestic investment in real assets and a general pick up in the domestic
economy. It would become more profitable to invest domestically in
real assets than to invest abroad in financial assets. As indicated earlier,
the pattern of allocation of private sector funds portrayed in Tables
4.4 and 4.5 for the rest of tile 1980s is similar to that of the 1983-
1985 period when real interest rates were high. As a resuh, tile bench-
mark projection is probably more consistent with interest rates mid-
way bet,.veen the assumptions of the fixed and declining interest scen-
arios.
If world and consequently domestic real interest rates were to fall
as envisaged under tile declining interest rate assumptions it would
restdt in a higher level of investment both by tile personal sector and
tile company sector. In tile case of tile personal sector tile change in
tile relative rates of return on finanelal assets and private residential
building would resuh in an increase in activity in tile housing market
over and above that foreseen in the benchmark projection. To some
extent tile savings rate of tile personal sector could be affected by a
fall in real interest rates on financial assets. In tile case of the insurance
companics and pension funds it would take some time for tiffs to feed
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through due to the term structure of existing securities which would
leave them with a continuing substantial inflow of funds. However, a
general rise in economic activity above that envisaged in the bench-
mark would, through increasing disposable income, tend to offset the
effects of a lower savings rate on the absolute level of savings.
In the company sector the effect of a fall in interest rates would be
to significantly increase the incentive to invest. The borrowing require-
ment for dais sector, when expressed as a percentage of GNP, is forecast
in the benchmark projection to be lower than at any point since the
early 1970s. The cost of capital to industry would fall directly as a
result of the fall in real interest rates while the forecast rate of increase
in profits is high. All this points to a significant potential response of
company sector investment to a fall in interest rates. A fall in interest
rates would of itself increase the internal funds available to the non-
financial company sector, which is a net debtor.
The increase in investmcnt brought about by a lower interest rate
would tend both directly and indirectly to increase imports. The import
content of non-building investment is high. The higher level of activity
generally would have an offsetting effect through raising the volume
of output. The increased level of activity would also have the effect
of reducing the exchequer borrowing requirement through increasing
the buoyancy of taxes and possibly reducing expenditure through
reducing unemployment. This in turn would tend to reduce the volume
of government debt on sale to the private sector.
If world real interest rates were to remain very high as envisaged
in the fixed interest rate scenario, the level of activity domestically
could fall below that of the benchmark projection. This would leave
an even larger volume of domestic funds to be invested abroad cor-
responding to an even higher balance of payments surplus.
The above discussion only considers some of the many channels
through ,vhich a fall in real interest rates could be expected to affect
the real economy. To quantify the effects and to even understand the
direction of change in certain variables where offsetting factors are at
work, requires a complete macro-economic model of the Irish economy.
The ESRI Medium-Term Model, while it lacks a fully articulated
financial sector, is a suitable tool for such an exercise. It is hoped to
use it to analyse this question at a future date.
Finally, the high borrowing option, if adopted, would ensure that
the public sector demand for funds would, if anything, maintain
upward pressure on domestic interest rates. In so far as attempts were
4O
made to finance the additional borrowing domestically, it would raise
domestic interest rates to a point where private capital inflows were
generated. Such a rise in interest rates, albeit limited, would have a
consequential dampening effect oil tile level of economic activity.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
5. I Introduction
This chapter first considers certain key aspects of tile meditml-term
prospects for tile national deht anti tile economy set out in tile rest
of this paper. Ill particular the likely trend in the debt/GNP ratio, ill
the balance of paynlents, and ill tile financial balance of the domestic
private sector are examined. Section 5.3 sets out the implications of
these developments for economic policy, in particular Ibr policy on
financing tile debt. Finally, certain conclusions are discussed in section
5.4.
5.2 Aspects of Medium-term Prospects for the Irish Economy
The analysis in this paper documents the continuing rise in tile
national debt/GNP ratio over tile last ten years. If this upward trend
is not rapidly brought trader control tile rise will become explosive;
as the ratio rises an ever larger proportion of national resources has
Io he devoted to servicing this debt and, if allowed to continue, tile
economy would reach a stage where it could no longer support this
cost. In Chapter 4 it was shown that, providing a strictly neutral fiscal
policy is pursued, this rise in tile debt/GNP ratio would be halted in
1987 or, under an unfavourable scenario concerning interest rates, by
1989. However, as oudincd in the previous chapter, tile adoption of
a "neutral" fiscal stance would involve significant cuts in levels of
services or increasc~’s in taxation title to the long-term trend rise ill
expezlditure. In partictdar, given the slippage which appears to have
taken place in 1986, the achievemcnt of the exchequer borrowing
figures in the benchmark projection would probably require an even
more restrictive fiscal stance in tile period 1987-1988.
The simulations described in Chapter 4 also show that under a more
stimulatory fiscal stance the dcbt/GNP ratio continues to rise
inexorably to the end of the decade. While a decline in real interest
rates may give a temporary respite in tile budgetary situation, it is
not el~otlgh to prevent the dcht/GNP ratio rising. If, on the other
han(l~ interest rates were to renlain unchanged at their current levels,
the rise in the deht/GNP ratio under the high borrowing assumptions
over the rest of the decade hecomes acute.
This paper has not considered the optimal time path for tile debt/
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GNP ratio or the desh’ed level of tile e,~chequer borrowing
recluirement.7 Howevcr, it is worth noting that the very high real
interest rates experienced in recent years must have reduced tile
optimal or desired level of both these aggregates. The government
should only borrow up to the point that tile marginal cost of borrowing
is equal to tile marginal social rate of return on tile expenditure
financed by tile borrowing. With high real interest rates and a
substantial proportion of borrowing going to finance current
expenditure rather than investment, tile real costs of such borrowing
to the community are very high, as evidenced by the continuous rise
in the debt/GNP ratio in recent years.
The current high level of government borrowing involves a future
comnlitmcnt to illajor changes in tile distribution of income. This
change in tile distribution of income has iml)ortant implications for
equity bctwecn different groups and, as highlighted in the last Central
Bank Annual report, necessitates high levels of taxation or lower
expenditure in tile future to meet tile interest payments. ’[’hese high
taxes rcsuh in distortions in the ccononly and involve significant
deadweight losses (for example, see Ballard, Shoven and Whalley,
1985). The cff,ects of borrowing to finance tile current deficit involves
a transfer fi’om future taxpayers to current taxpayers or eonstllYlers of
government services. The level of borrowing also rcsuhs in a transfer
from the coinmunity :.tt large to those who have accumulated wcahh
in the form of governnlent securities. In recent years those who have
invested in insurance policies, unit trtlsts and pension funds have
benefitted greatly from high real interest rates and substantial capital
gains. The sut’t,erers are tile community at large who have to fund tile
payments.
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the high level of debt and new
borrowing also leaves the economy vulnerable to adverse developments
in world interest rates. Our problems have been greatly magnified in
the past by a rise in world real interest rates and will be further
complicated in the future if these rates do not fall towards historically
more normal levels.
A second important feature of the benchmark scenario is the
improvenaent in the current balance of payments over tile rest of the
decade. If tile projected surplus oil Cl.lrrellt aeeoui]t actually OeCtlrSI
it will be the first occasion over the last forty years that tile country
7. See Bacon, (1986) fiw such a discussion.
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has run zl surl)lus for a number of years in succession. Even if the
surplus Ihils to occur, due to some or all of the factors discussed hi
Chapter 4, the current account is likely to come close to balance. This
has significant implications Ior policy on financing the exchequer
borrowing requirenlent over the rest of the decade. If all financial
instruments were interchangeable a current balance of payments
surphis, would melin Ihal the exchequer borrowing requirement could
all he financed domestically. To tim extent timt government debt is
not interchangeable with other assets, such as equities or lending
abroad, some fbrcign horrowing by the pnhlic sector inay bedesirable,
in spite of a current account balance of payments surphls~ to
accommodate the desire of the private sector to hold a mixed porttblio
of financial assets. As argued in chapter four, the magnitude of the
private capital outflow in the medium term would be likely to be
much smaller than in the recent past, due to the improvement in the
puhlic linances and the current account of the balance of payments
envisaged in the benchmark scenario. Given a current balance of
payments surplus, while tim government sector is borrowing abroad
and incurring a liability to pay interest on that debt abroad, these
future interest payments will, fi’om tile point o|" view of the economy
as a whole, bc off’set by the investment income arising from the private
sector fi)reign investment, hi undertaking this Ibreign investment the
private sector would he expressing the view that they could obtain a
higher return from investments abroad than fi’om domestic investment.
To the extent that they are right they would be maximising national
income in the longer term although it would do little to reduce the
level of unenlployment domestically and might erode the domestic tax
base.
The analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that fi’om 1988 onwards, on the
basis of the benchmark projection, foreign borrowing will account for
a rapidly declining share of the exchequer borrowing requirement. It
is only if there were a substantial permanent change compared to
1984 or 1985 in the expected relative profitability of foreign investment
that the private capital outflow would continue at a high level. Under
the benclmaark projection, such a change would appear unlikely given
the tendency Ibr the current balance of payments to improve, the deht/
GNP ratio to I~.11 and given that the projected margin hetween Irish
and foreign interest rates is greater than the projected depreciation in
the Irish pound over the period. Even if there were a continuing
significant capital outflov¢, provided the current halance of payments
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remained favourable, this should not give rise to an attempt to choke
it off by raising domestic interest rates. It is only if tile outflow on
the balance oF payments Occurs on the current ~lCCOklnt, where the
money is not invested abroad generating future inflows of profits or
interest, that the foreign/domestic composition of government
borrowing should be viewed with concern.
The third aspect of the outlook for the h’ish economy which must
affect policy on financing tile debt is tile m~kjor change in tile allocation
of private sector resources described in C’.laapter 4. The shift by the
private sector from investing in real capital to investing in financial
assets, chiefly governnlent securitics, is a major cause Ibr concern. The
efl’ccts of the fall off" in building investment on tile econonly generally
are well documented. The I~dl off in the investment in productive
capacity has rednced tbe potential growth rate of tile economy in tbe
rcccnt past and will, if continued into tile future, restrict growth in
the economy to tile end of tile decade. To the extent that this shift
has been caused by cbanges in tile expected rates of return on Ihc
different assets, it is an issue which must be considered in examining
policy on financing the exchequer borrowing rcctuircment.
5.3 Polio,
’File problcms thcing the h’ish economy over the rest of the decade
have been discussed elsewhere. In the previous section we highlighted
certain aspects of the economic outlook which should affect policy in
the medium term. While some positive features emerge, it is clear that
tile size of tile national debt leaves no scope for using a fscal stimulus
to raise growth of output or employnlent.
The discussion also highlighted tbc problems posed for the Irish
economy by high real intcrcst ratcs. It is in this area that tile policy
on debt management can make a contribution, althongh, as discussed
in Chapter 2, the scope for influencing domestic interest rates in an
open economy such as h’eland is limited. It arises from two sources:
the risk aversion of investors at home and abroad whicb determines
a limited band within which interest rates may be affected by internal
factors, and the possibility of influencing expectations concerning the
future movement in exchange rates. Policy on the composition of tile
financing of tile excbequer borrowing recluirement has, in the recent
past, had a significant temporary influence on the domestic rate of
interest. In late 1984 the commitment to a fixed, level of foreign
borrowing resulted in a rise in domestic interest rates unrelated to
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external facors or exchange rate expectations. However, the purchase
of Irish government debt by non residents in the first half of 1985
indicated that there was an upper lirnit on tile extent to whicl~ the
borrowing requirement could be financed domestically by raising
interest rates. The perceived commitment to a domestic funding target
has again been an influence driving up interest rates in the third
quarter of 1986, ahhotlgh a number of other fuctors are also at work.
The effect of trying to maximise domestic funding of the borrowing
requirement in recent years has, if anything, raised the interest cost
of financing the national debt. Instead of setting a fairly inflexible
domestic (or foreign) funding target divorced from the current
economic situation it would be preferable if tile composition of
exchequer borrowing were chosen to minimise the expected cost of
financing that borrowing. This would involve increasing the share of
foreign borrowing under circumstances where domestic interest rates
arc coming under upward pressure from domestic sources, as in late
1985 or again in the third quarter of 1986. If the benchmark projection
proves correct it would probably involve substantially reducing foreign
borrowing in the years 1988-1990. As outlined in the previous section,
the current balance of payments situation does not warrant a rigid
approach to foreign borrowing.
In choosing the composition of foreign borrowing and the underlying
foreign dehl, the current policy of spreading risk hy borrowing in a
range of currencies should be continued. It is not the role of the
government to gamble by plumping for horrowing in any one currency.
The adoption of a more flexible policy on the composition of the
borrowing between domestic and foreign sources would, as discussed
in Chapter 2 only have a restricted effect on domestic interest rates.
Over the past four years it was only for limited periods of time that
debt financing policy raised interest rates. For the future a change in
this aspect of policy can only ensure that Irish interest rates Ib.II in
line with a fall in world interest rates.
However, there is another factor which affects domestic interest rates
which may be susceptible to limited domestic influence; that is
exchange rate expectations. Irish interest rates are equal to foreign
interest rates plus a margin determined by the expected change in
exchange rates. Over the first half of the decade this margin for
expected exchange rate changes compared to the DM has tended to
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be greater thau the actual change.8 Because expectations for the Irish
exchange rate vis-a-vis the DM over those years were weaker than
the actual outturn, rca} iutcrcst rates wcrc higher than wcrc warrantcd
by the actual outturu. This raises the question of the appropriate
stance of exchange rate policy. The devaluation of August 1986 went
some way towards validating previous exchange rate expectations and
brought about an improvement in competitiveness, albeit temporary,
(see Flynn, 1986). The cost is that it will fuel cxpcctations ofslmilar
devaluations in the future leading to higher interest rates than might
otherwise be the case. It also tends to increase the uncertainty
concerning the future value of the exchange rate which in turn adds
to domestic interest rates. For the future, exchange rate policy can
either validate expectations, and so avoid a rise in ex-post real interest
rates by raising inflation, or else, by sticking to the current EMS
parity, attempt to reduce over time the uncertainty concerning
exchange rates. This ]atter course ofaetion would result in the interest
premium (on foreign rates) falling and consequently a reduction in
domestic real interest rates. In the longer term the reduction in
exchange rate uncertainty and the resulting saving in terms of lower
interest rates is to be desired. The fact that it was not achieved in the
first seven years of membership was due to the inappropriate nature
of the other aspects of public policy in those years. For the future, a
change in exchange rate uncertainty and expectations so as to reduce
domestic interest rates will depend not only on exchange rate policy
but also on the stance of other aspects of domestic policy, in particular
fiscal policy.
The upturn in domestic investment which is so necessary to bring
about a higher rate of growth depends very much on the evolution
of foreign interest rates. Economic policy abroad, in particular in
Germany and the US, will determine the underlying trend in real
interest rates generally in international markets, and consequently, in
h’elaud. The minimum that domestic policy on the composition of
exchequer borrowing should aim to achieve is the elimination of
temporary rises in interest rates above this world trend. In the longer
term, it may be possible to reduce interest rates through adopting a
set of policies designed to minimise uncertainty concerning the
excba~ge rate.
8. For borrowing by the Irish governmenl in 1980 and 1981 wilh a maturity of five years the
ex/~st yield was lower on DM than I fish pound borrowing. On the basis of the benchmark
lime profile for exchange rales the same would b~ true of borrowing in 1982-85.
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Finally, it was argued earlier in this paper that the personal sector
may have a higher level of saving than it would choose if it had full
information on its asset position, in particular on its savings in pension
funds, life insurance etc. The effect of this higher saving is to reduce
the current balance of payments deficit while raising the current budget
dcficit. It might be dcsirablc, if thc current account of the balance of
payments moves into surplus, to consider some change to alter this
situation. One approach is that adopted in the recent UK finance bill
which aims to improve the flow of information to savers. Another
possible approach could be through some limited change in the tax
system.
5.4 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper shows that the problem of the pnhlic
finances, as proxied by the national debt/GNP ratio has been
considerably aggravated by the rise in real interest rates internationally
and remains a major cause for concern. Nevertheless, it also suggests
that, given a tight fiscal policy stance and some easing of interest rates,
this key ratio could begin to fall from 1988 onwards. This chink of
light at the end of what has been a very long tunnel should provide
some incentive to pursue appropriate policies. The rewards to eflbrt
in the field of the puhlic finances need not be postponed indefinitely.
However, the analysis also shows that any relaxation of a strict fiscal
policy stance could lead to an explosive increase in the public finance
problem with all that that implies for future growth in income,
employment, and the distribution of income. While the paper makes
reccommcndations on how policy could best be directed to reducing
domestic interest rates and so promoting future growth it also shows
that we remain extremely dependent on developments in the outside
world. A continuation of current very high real interest rates abroad
would directly affect the Irish economy and would slow the resolution
of the public finance prohlem.
Finally, as indicated in the rest of the paper, our knowledge of how
the Irish economy operates in the post EMS environment remains
incomplete. Our experience of very high real interest rates has been
so recent that their full implications for the real economy are not yet
fully understood. As a result, policy for the future must be framed in
a flexible manner to take account of continuing uncertainty as to its
likely effects.
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Appendix I
THE DEBT SIMULATION MODEL
(i) Introduction
The model used is, in principle, extremely simple. It takes as input
all published information on the existing structure of the debt for tile
starting date oft simulation. For each loan the following information
is used: interest rates, repayment dates, number of interest payments
a year etc. When taken together with forecasts for exchange rates and
interest rates~ these data should allow reasonably precise estimates of
interest payable, debt repayments and debt outstanding for existing
debt. Given [breeasts for new foreign and domestic borrowing, forecast
repayments on existing debt, and given certain assumptions concerning
tile instruments used to finance nev,, borrowing, tile model also
produces estimates of interest payable and debt outstanding for the
forecast period. Tile model produces estimates of interest payments
and debt repayments on a monthly and an annual basis. Details of
the assumptions underlying the model’s treatment ofexisting domestic
debt are given in Section (ii). Similar information for existing foreign
debt is given in Section (iii) and tile assumptions underlying the
treatment of domestic and foreign borrowing undertaken after the
start of a simulation are given in Sections (iv) and (v) respectively.
Section (vi) sets out the assumptions concerning small savings and
Section (vii) examines the tracking performance of this rnodel over
the period 1980-85.
(ii) Existing Domestic Debt
For existing domestic national loans (including exchequer bills),
both fixed rate and variable rate, full information is available from
the Finance Accounts and stock exchange listings. This information
is updated regularly by the Central Bank (Table DI in the Annual
Report, 1986) and is available in the newspapers. For fixed interest
debt the model needs information on the face value of the debt
outstanding,2 the nominal interest rate on that debt, the earliest and
I. In tile case oft simulation for a historical period the exchange rate, inlerest rate and borrowing
dat;i are the historlcal figures for the relevant peri~xl,
2. The amount i~ued is not necessarily the same as the amount in the hands of the pubbc.
Some debt is held by various government extra budgetary funds. New issues of tranehe~ of stock
are held by tbe Post Office Savings Bank fund pending sale to the public. Discussion of the
adjustments needed to take account of these and other factors in arriving at national debt
interest on a national accounts basis is given ill Appendix 2.
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latest years when the debt is repayable and tile month it is repayable,
tile first month in the year on which interest is payable and tile number
of interest payments in a year. In the case of variable interest rate
debt tile interest rate is the annual mark up on the exchequer bill
yield. In addition, where tile mark up changes over tile lifetime of the
debt tile ahernative mark up and the year in which it changes is
supplied. Finally, for variable interest rate debt the lag with which
the interest rate is linked to the exchequer bill rate must be supplied:
this is generally three or six months. The computer programme, wbich
is available from the author, takes tbis information, and the forecast
exchequer bill rate and calculates the interest payable on eacb
individual loan, monthly, up to tile date of repayment. For simplicity,
in the case of fixed interest debt witfi alternative repayment dates, it
is assumed that the debt is repaid in tile first month in which tile
forecast yield oil medium term government debt is less than the
nominal interest rate oll the relevant bond. The computer programme
can produce forecasts, for each loan and for all loans taken together
on a monthly and an annual basis, of interest paid, debt repayment
and debt outstanding.
(iii) Exisli~g Fore(¢n Debt
In tile case of foreign debt, both fixed rate and variable rate, mucb
less information is available to the public from the Finance Accounts
and other published sources. For both fixed and variable interest rate
debt, the two pieces of information which are available in every case
are the amount outstanding and the currency in which the debt is
denominated. In the case of fixed interest debt tile interest rate and
repayment years are generally known. The repayment months, the
months in wbich interest is paid and number of interest payments in
a year are generally not accessible.
In tile case of variable interest rate debt the interest rate to which
tile loans are related and the margin on that interest rate are not
known with any certainty. While the repayment year is known in
certain cases, it is generally not available for the bulk of variable rate
forcign debt covercd by borrowing from the EIB, revolving credit
facilities and other foreign borrowing.
These lacunae in the information required by the model are filled
by means of tile following assumptions:
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(a) whcrc the rcpaymcnt month is unknown it is assumed to bc end
December fox" fixed interest debt and end September for variable
interest debt;
(b) where the repayment ),car is unknown (e.g., for the revolving
credits) it is assumed to be 1995;
(c) tile interest rate to which the variable rate debt is linked is assttmed
to be LIBOR for 6 months borrowing in the relevant currency;
(d) the margin on LIBOR for the variable rate dcbt is assumed to
be 0.25 pcr cent a },cai’;
(e) wficrc the first nlontfi in which interest is payable is tlnkllo~.vn it
is assumed to be,June for fixed rate debt and .,March for variable
rate debt;
(]) the number of interest payments in a ycar is generally assumed
to be two. In the case of fixed interest debt incurred in 1985 it
is assumed to be onc payment per year;
(g) in the case of the variable interest debt the interest payments arc
asstzmed to be related to LIBOR with a six months lag;
(h) no debt is repaid belbrc the last permitted date.
If morc detailed information on individual loans could be obtained
the above assnmptions would be unnecessary and there would bc a
rcsuhing improvement in the model’s performance.
(iv) Domestic Debt Issued After Start of Simulalion
All new domestic borrowing by way of national loans carried out
after the start of the simulation period is assumed to be in the form
of fixed interest debt. A similar assumption is made concerning the
refinancing of both variable and fixed rate debt which is repaid. The
instrument used is assumed to be a national loan repayable at end
September five years after the date of issue. The nominal interest rate
of the chosen instrument is optional, being an input into the model.
hltcrest payrtlents are asstlnled to be nlade on this new instrument in
March and September. Thc selling price [br this instrument in each
month is determined by the above information togcther with the
tbrecast bond yield for that month for bonds maturing in five years’
dine. The formula uscd is given in Appcndix 3.
(v) J~,’~w Foreign Debt
All borrowing and refinancing of existing foreign debt carried ont
after the start of the simulation period is assumed to be undertaken
using variable interest debt. This new debt is assumed to be repayable
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after the year 2000. Interest is assumed to be payable twice yearly in
March and September and the mark up on LIBOR is a quarter of a
per cent a year. It is assumed that this debt is sold at face value no
matter which month ~n the year the borrowing is undertaken. The
currency composition of tile new debt can either be input into the
tootle] or the default setting is that the composition is the same as
that of total existing foreign debt at the commencement of the exercise.
(vi) Small Savings
The definition of small savings used here is slightly different from
that used in the Finance Accounts. Exchequer bills are included with
the national loans. Small savings are here defined as savings certs,
prize bonds, tax reserve ccrts, investment bonds, national instalment
savings and index linked savings bonds, all as defined in the Finance
Accounts, and lending of the Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks
to the government.
The forecast borrowing by way of small savings is turned into a
monthly flow by dividing the annual figure by 12. The interest payable
is calculated each mouth as one twelfth of the annual interest rate
times the forecast debt outstanding in each month.
(vii) Model Tracking Performance 1980-85
The model was applied to data for the period 1980 to 1985 to
examine its performance to see whether the data used are sufficiently
accurate and whether the level of detail in the model is adequate. To
the extent that the model fails to track the actual outturn for the
period, it is an indicatiou that some of the model’s simplifying
assumptioas are unreasonable. In principle, if full information were
available on the terms of foreign borrowing it should be possible to
reproduce exactly the outturn for the simulation period. Actual
historical interest rate and exchange rate data were used. The currency
composition of the foreign borrowing in each quarter was chosen so
that the end quarter currency composition was the same as that given
in the Central Bank quarterly for each quarter. The structure of the
existing clebt at the beginning of the simulation was taken as given
at the end of 1979. For simplicity, the nominal interest rate on new
domestic fixed interest debt issued throughout the period was taken
to be a constant II per cent.
,"t comparison of the model’s estimate of interest on national loans
(including exchequer bills but excluding small savings) with the actual
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interest paynaents is given in Table AI.I anti figureAl.I. As can be
seen, the model’s estimates are reasonably close to the actual interest
paid each year. To the extent that there is a discrepancy it is due to
the simplifying assumption of a constant II per cent nonainal rate on
new debt issued. If the correct average nominal interest rate on new
issues were used for each year the model results would be even closer
to the actual outturn.
A similar comparison for foreign borrowing is shown in Table AI.2
"Fable A 1. I : Comparison of model’s estimate with actual iaterest payments on
.National Loans
£ million
}~ar Actual Estimate
198~ 398,7 425.7
1981 503.5 493,3
1982 573.9 574.0
1983 699.0 667.4
1984 780.6 762,8
1985 950.7 869.1
Fig. A I.I. Comparison of E~timated and Actual Interest on National Loans
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and Figure AI.2. As can be seen fi’om this table the results are much
less satisfactory for foreign borrowing than fi~r domeslic borrowing.
While tl~e resuhs show some improvement as the absolute size of the
debt rises, they are still far from satisfactory. The fact that the
percentage error falls as the absolute size of the interest payments rise
is due to the fact that the problems relate primarily to tbe handling
of interest on new borrowing in the current ),ear. As a result, as the
volumc of new borrowing in the future will represent an ever decreasing
proportion of existing debt the reliability of the model should continue
to improve. These results suggest that there is a need to improve the
information used in the model on tbe terms of existing foreign debt
and the managcmcnt of this debt over time.
Table A1.2: Comparison of model’s estimate with actual interest payments on foreign
borrowing
/"ear Actual Estimatem
1980 161.4 196,7
1981 249.4 315.4
1982 509.9 582.8
1983 577.4 538.3
1984 692.6 628.2
1985 783.0 742.4
"l’otal 2,973.7 3,003.8
Fig. A I.2. Comparison of Estimated and Actual Interest on Foreign Borrowing
800 I- I
i-
I
700 I-
~
" -I
I- ~ °1
f~O0 i-
~- . / I
I ¯ ~ |
500 I - ’
-- I
+oo ;- ,’ -5
.,
I- /
-I
300 I- ."
-I
I- /
-I
200
- t
-I
I00l- -I
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
SYMBOL VARIABLE ~ ACTUAL
---~* ESTIMATE
56
Appendix 2
DF.RI\;?,TION OF NATIONAL DEBT INTEI{F~ST
ON A NATIONAL ACCOUNTS BASIS
Set out below is the dcl’iVzllioll o[" Ihc Central CovernnlClll national
dcbt hatcrest figurcs Ibr 198’t. To this must bc addcd land bond intcrcst
and imcrcst pakl by local aud~oritlcs to the private sector to obtain
Public Authorities’ national debt in|crest paynacnts. Thc derivation of
land bond ]lllCrcsI 1111(I Local Authorhics’ i~ltcrcst paylllC1115 is llOI
discusscd here.
The basic source tbr this inlbrmation is the Finance Accounts (FA).
Sct out below is thc dcriv;Ition of Ihc 1984 figures {’or Ccnlral
Government national dcbl imcrcst, item 143 in National Income and
Expcnditurc 1983 and’1984-.
"rOT;d. 1517.0
add 6.0
TOTAl, 1523.0
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Appendix 3
REI./~TION BETWEEN MARKET YIELD AND SALE PRICE
OF THE DEBT
Ill each case tbe debt instrument is assunled to have a fixed nominal
yield maturing at end Scl~tcmber ill year n+5 wbere n is tile current
year. Interest is assumed to be payable twice yearly at end March
and end September. Giw:n tbe Ibreeast market yield on this debt
inslrtmleIH, it is desired to obtain tbc instrument’s sale price in each
month of the year. "Flat: |brmula is given below:
P = [(i((I +r)’--1)+r) / (r(I +,)’)] (I +,)";      fl)
P = tile sale price (~f a stock wltb nonlilla] value of I unit
r = (I+R)J--I
where R is die yield to maturity.
I = nunlfier of interest payments left before the stock illature$.
i.e., up to March of year n / -- 10
April to September of year n t = 9
September to I)ccember of ),eat" n t = 8
m = months since last interest payment.
Derivation:
Tbe discounted present value of future irtterest payments is S,
S, = i/(I +r)+il(l +r)’~ + ....... i/(I +r)’ (2)
muhiply S, by I](1 +r) and subtract from equation (2) to give equation
3:
S, rl(I +r) = i](I +r)-i/(I +r)I’+’l (3)
The discounted present wdue (V,) of the stock on maturity is:
I/(I +r)’ (4)
Rearranging (3) to give S~ and adding the discounted present value
of the stock on maturity (4) gives:
V,+S, = (i((I +r)’-I)+r)l(r(I +r)’) (5)
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This must be [’urthcr adjusted to take account of the intercst accrued
cach month since thc last payment of interest. The resulting equation
is shown above as equation (I).
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A p pc nd ix 4
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
Thc macro-economic assumptions underlying the analysis in this
paper are based on Bacon (1986). However, these figures have been
sul~icctcd to limited acljustnlent to take account of recent changes in
oil prices and exchange ratcs. Generally, this has been accomplished
by taking the latest Oumrter~ Economic Commentary (August 1986) figures
and rcbasing the major nlacro-economic aggregatcs in Bacon (1986)
for the ycars 1988-1990. The resulting GNP and balance of payments
figures are shown in Table A4.1. This proccdurc is essentially
unsatisfactory but, in the absence of a full model based forecast, was
the only feasible approach. As a rcsuh, the adjusted numbcrs should
not be taken as a forecast. They are useful as a framework, for carrying
out the analysis contained in this paper providing, as they do, an
h~dicadon of tim rough order of r~mgnitude of certain key variables.
The exchequer horrowlng requirement figures shown in Table A4.1
have not been adjusted to take account of recent developments so that
they may well uudcrcstinmte borrowing in 1986 and, consequently,
in 1987, due to overruns in 1986. However, this should not aher trends
in the mediuna term and the range of possibilities covered by the
optimistic and pcssimistic sccnarios should give a reasonable indication
Table A4. 1: A4acro-Economic Aggregates
1986 1987    19R8    1989    1990
A. Neutral Budgcl
GNP value 16,423 17,269 18,820 20,240 21,840
Balance of paymcnls value 210 -330 240 345 450
As I~rcemagc of GNP - 1.3 - 1.0 1,3 1.7 2. I
Fxchequcr I~wrowhlg requirement 1.955 1.865 1,780 1,650 1,650
Forclgn borrowhlg 600 300 280 150 100
I)omesfic national loans 1.155 1,350 1,270 1,255 1,290
Domcsllc small savings 200 215 230 245 260
B. High,:r Exchequer B.rmwing
GNP value 16,423 17,269 18,820 20,040 21,410
Balance of p:efments value --210 --500 --225 --200 -- 150
As percentage of GNP - 1.3 -2.9 - 1.2 - 1.0 -0.7
Exchequer I~wmwlng rcquiremcnl 1,955 1,930 2,075 2,450 2,60~
F~,r,:ign I.,rrowing 600 365 575 950 1,050
I).mcstic national Icbans 1.155 1,350 1.270 1,255 1,290
I)omcslic small savings 200 215 230 245 260
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of the sensitivity of the resuhs to variations in total borrowing.
"l’hc breakdown of tile borrowing figures between different sources
of finance for tile lacutral budget set of assumptions is taken fi’O111
Bacon. In the alternative pessimistic fiscal policy option (B) (Tablc
A,I-.I), domestic borrowing is held unchanged and all additional
borrowing is assumed to be undertaken ahroad. For simplicity all new
borrowing by means of national loans is assumed to he undertaken
by means of securities maturing in five years with a fixed nominal
interest rate. ’l’hat fixed nominal interest rate (or coupon) is tile
average yield on medium tern’A governnacnt debt assumed for the
relevant year. As a resuh the sale price of the debt is close to its face
vahle. Also tbr simplicity all new foreign borrowing is assnmed to he
tmdertaken by issuing variahlc rate deht. The currency composition
of this borrowing is assumed to he identical to the composition of tile
debt outstanding at tile cud of 1985. However, given the assumption
concerning interest rates and exchange rates, discussed below, changes
in the currency composition of foreign borrowing make little differencc
to the resuhs.
The model also requires assumptions concerning future interest rates
and exchange rates. The first set of assumptions (A) (Tahle A4.1) are
hased on a reduction in world real interest rates over tile rest of the
decade together with a marginal changc in exchange rates which
broadly matches the projected interest diit’crentials. The second set of
assumptions takes the nominal interest rates and cxchange rates as
fixed at their levels immediately after the devaluation of tile Irish
pound in early August 1986. Neither set of assumptions is intended
as a Ibrccast. In preparing thc sct of assumptions, A, (declining real
interest rates) cotmtries were hroken up into three broad groups. The
first group Germany, .Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland were
assumed to have a long run inflation rate of 2 per cent. This together
with an assumed real interest rate of 2 per cent gave a long run
nominal interest rate of’4 per cent. It was assumed that these countries
would generally approach this long run rate by thc cnd of 1986 and
remain thcre. This invoh,es a small fall from end April 1986 intcrcst
rates. The second group covered Ireland, France and Belgium whose
currencies were assumed to devalue by ] per cent a year from end
1986 compared to the first group giving a long run inflation rate of
3 per cent. On top of tile real interest rate of 2 per cent a further 1
per cent was added to cover a perceived additional risk to lenders in
these currencies. This gave a long run interest rate of 6 per cent. It
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was assumed that this long run rate would be approached more slowly
than is the case for the first group, due to continuing uncertainty ahout
the permanence of current exchange rates in tile EMS. For the US
and tile UK it ",’,,as assumed that there would he some further small
devaluation vis-a-vis the Irish pound over the period 1986-1990 and
interest rates were adjusted to reflect this trend.
The alternative set of assumptions concerning interest rates and
exchange rates (B) involved simulating the effects of holding interest
rates and exchange rates at their levels of early August, immediately
after tile devaluation of the Irish pound. This set of assumptions is
also shown in Table A4.2.
Table A4.2: Assumptions on Interest Rates and Exchange Rates, 1986--1990
Interest Rate LIBOR
at 6 months
b.]rchange Raft ~,, Irish
per unit of foreign currency
Country Assumption B    Assumption A    Assumption B    Assumption A
August End End August End End
1986 1987 1990 1986 1987 1990
USA 6.38 6 5 0.743 0.743 0.743
G~:rmzny 4.63 4 4 0.359 0.363 0.374
Japan 4.7 4 4 0.005 0.005 0.005
UK 9.9 7 6 1.098 1.098 1,098
EEC 7.0 5.6 5.3 0.757 0.759 0.765
Switzerland 4.6 4 4 0,445 0.450 0.464
Netherlands 5.5 4 4 0.319 0.322 0.332
haly 10.8 9 8 0.001 0.001 0.000
Belgium 7.5 6 6 0.017 0.017 0.017
France 7.3 6 6 0.111 0.111 0.111
Ireland* 10.32 7 6 I I I
*Yield on debt wilh 5 yea~ to maturity.
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